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INTRODUCTION
Computer-mediated social network sites are omnipresent and among the most
popular of all web destinations. There seem to be few limits on who is posting
or the subject matter of posts, and there is scant guidance on the appropriate
limits for online social interactions. Originally, such sites were the exclusive
playground of teenagers and college students (who continue to be the majority
of users).2 Not surprisingly given this original demographic, media and legal
scrutiny concentrated on the potential of such sites to enable child predators,3
facilitate other abuses of children and young adults such as bullying,4 and
encourage graffiti behavior in adolescent users.5
Although teenagers and young adults remain the dominant groups using
social network sites, adult usage quadrupled between 2005 and 20086 as adults
migrated to Facebook and MySpace initially, perhaps, to connect with their
children and grandchildren.7 By December 2008, 35% of online adults had used
a social network site.8 Of course, all users do not equally enjoy all social
network activities. For example, updating one's personal status using Twitter or
Facebook's "What's on your mind?" feature continues to be an activity
1. Seinfeld: The Pool Guy (NBC television broadcast Nov. 16, 1995).
2. Amanda Lenhart, ADULTS AND SOCIALNETWORK WEBsITES, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN
LIFE PROJECT (2009), http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP_AdultSocial_
networkingdatamemo_FINAL.pdf.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 600
(2008).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Drew, No. CR 08-0582-GW, 2009 WL 2872855 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 28, 2009); Lauren Collins, Friend Game: Behind the Online Hoax That Led to a Girl's
Suicide, NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2008/01/21/080121 fa fact collins; Alexandra Zavis, MySpace Conviction in Doubt, L.A. TIMES,
July 3, 2009, at A3, available at 2009 WLNR 12700576.
5. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text (cases involving, for example,
schoolchildren posting abusive materials about their schools or teachers).
6. Lenhart, supra note 2, at 1.
7. John D. Sutter, All in the Facebook Family: Older Generations Join Social Networks,
CNN.COM, Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECHI04/13/social.network.older/.
8. Lenhart, supra note 2, at 1; see also Sutter, supra note 7.
[Vol. 43:285
2010] LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL NETWORKING 287
dominated by young adults.9
Online social networks are increasingly attracting the attention of large and
small businesses and professionals as vehicles for advertising, marketing, and
providing customer support.'0 For example, 54% of attorneys belong to an online
social network,"' although membership remains skewed towards younger
professional users. 2  As the demographics of and motivations behind
participation in social networks evolve, the foundational teenager versus teenager
relationships and inevitable disputes will be replaced by more complex
relationships and risks that are considerably more nuanced.
This Article focuses on one highly complex relationship, that of physician
and patient. That relationship, together with the related imperative of protecting
patient information, constitutes a crucial component of the legal domain
applicable to our most highly regulated industry. Recent inquiries into the trust
and confidence properties of the physician-patient relationship and the protection
of patient data concentrated on the technical (diagnostic, pharmacy, etc.) data
associated with the care relationship. Thus, questions have been asked about the
adequacy of protection for networked or interoperable electronic records. ' Such
inquires have escalated as patients have been encouraged to leverage technology
to store their own "personal" health records." This Article is less interested in
technical medical data and more with social data that implicates health and
9. AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH Fox, TWITTER AND STATUS UPDATING, PEW INTERNET
& AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 1 (2009), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/
Reports/2009/PIP%20Twitter/o 20Memo%20FINAL.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Posting of Douglas A. McIntyre to 24/7 WallSt.com, http://247wallst.com/
2009/05/26/the-ten-ways-twitter-will-permanently-change-american-business (May 26, 2009,20:11
EST); see also Nicola Clark, Airlines Follow Passengers Onto Social Media Sites, N.Y. TIMES, July
29,2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/30/business/global/30tweetair. html; Amy Miller, FMC
Turns to Social Networking to Find Law Firms, LAW.COM, May 18, 2009, http://www.law.
corn/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=1202430756051 (discussing use by client to increase its pool
of potential outside counsel through post on Legal OnRamp, a social network for lawyers); Richard
Raysman & Peter Brown, BehavioralAds: SocialNetworks 'Latest Legal Pitfall?, LAW.COM, Mar.
25,2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/pubArticleLT.jsp? id=900005506762; Jason
Snell, Nine Twitter Tips for Business: How to Strike the Right Balance When Using This Popular
Messaging Service, MACWORLD, May 4, 2009, http://www.macworld.com/article/140254/2009/
05/twitterdos.html.
11. Survey Reveals Growth in Online Professional Networking Among Legal Professionals,
AppetiteforLawyer-Specific Networking Solutions, July 10, 2008, http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20080710005598/en.
12. Id. (reporting membership of 25-35 (67%), 36-45 (49%), and 46-55+ year olds (36%)).
13. See Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of
Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 681, 691-96; see also Leslie P. Francis, The
Physician-Patient Relationship and a National Health Information Network, J.L. MED. & ETHICS
(forthcoming).
14. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs and
Risks to Consumers?, 1 DREXEL L. REv. 216 (2009).
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health-related decision-making. Here, the inquiry is how our legal, ethical, and
regulatory models will react as the social network phenomenon overlaps with
traditional healthcare relationships and businesses.
The analysis draws on the limited extant law dealing specifically with social
network interactions and the law and ethics literature dealing with existing
computer-mediated interactions between physicians and patients. The legal
analysis principally is concerned with privacy and confidentiality constructs,
described below as the "Law of Boundaries." The Article explores how
participation in online social networks may blur boundaries between personal and
professional relationships or commentary, while making available "private"
information in what only appears to be a secluded area. The Article also
examines the potential for amelioration of risks with the currently under-utilized
privacy and security settings provided by the online social networks.
The Law of Boundaries is applied to some specific scenarios where category
breakdown may be detected: (1) physician social information online, (2) patient
health-related information online, (3) physicians and patients as "friends," and
(4) physicians "tweeting" or posting about their work. These online scenarios
challenge the perceptions, expectations, and sense of trust that are the properties
of the offline physician-patient relationship. The application of legal, ethical,
and regulatory models to these "worlds collide" phenomena casts doubts on the
appropriateness of some professional activities and the online social activities of
some physicians. Additionally, the Article identifies the considerable risks run
by online patients who post about or otherwise signal their health status. Among
several conclusions applicable to these social network scenarios it is suggested
that the Law of Boundaries must evolve to protect non-public data or secluded
areas established by users of social network sites.
I. SOCIAL NETWORKS
The most popular social network sites include Facebook, MySpace, Twitter,
and Linkedln."5 Facebook has in excess of 250 million registered users 6 and its
subscribers spend more than three billion minutes per day on the web site.' 7 Of
these services Facebook 8 and Twitter 9 currently show the largest growth.
15. Posting of Andy Kazeniac to Compete.com, http:/Iblog.compete.com/2009/02/09/
facebook-MySpace-twitter-social-network/ (Feb. 9, 2009).
16. Erick Schonfeld, FacebookIs Now the Fourth Largest Site in the World, TECHCRUNCH,
Aug. 4,2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/08/04/facebook-is-now-the-fourth-largest-site-in-
the-world (reporting 340 million unique visitors).
17. Owen Thomas, Facebook at 5: What the Future Holds, Feb. 4 2009, http://valleywag.
gawker.com/5145975/facebook-at-5-what-the-ifuture-holds.
18. See Schonfeld, supra note 16.
19. Kelly Gregor, Twitter Takes Top Growth Spot, NAT'L Bus. REv. 24/7, Jan. 27, 2010,
http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/twitter-takes-top-growth-spot-117639. Compare Top 10 Social-
Networking Websites & Forums-February 2009, http://www.marketingcharts.con/interactive/top-
10-social-networking-websites-forums-february-2009-8286/ (showing that Twitter was not a top
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Eleven percent of online American adults use Twitter or features on social
network service sites to share information or read "updates" from others.2 ' The
use of social network sites is now so pervasive that we may well be on our way
to what Anita Allen described as "the technological conceit of twenty-first
century'lifelogging.'
2 1
Our contemporary concept of social networking is a subset of computer-
mediated (or computer network-mediated) communication. This latter, broader
term includes email, blogs, web sites, and instant messaging.22 These extant
models of computer network-mediated communication will inform the discussion
that follows. However, they lack the distinctive features of social network
services.
A. Properties of Social Networks
According to one court, "[o]nline social networking is the practice of using
a Web site or other interactive computer service to expand one's business or
social network."23 Boyd and Ellison provide a granular definition: "[W]eb-based
services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile
within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share
a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made
by others within the system. '24
There are two broad categories of computer-mediated social networks. First,
there are those, like Linkedln, 5 that emphasize professional or business
ten social networking site in Feb. 2009), and Marketing Charts, Top 10 Social-Networking
Websites & Forums-March 2009, http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactl've/top-10-social-
networking-websites-forums-february-2009-2-8749/ (showing that by March 2009 Twitter was the
eighth most popular social networking site), with Marketing Charts, Top 10 Social-Networking
Websites & Forums-October 2009, http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/top-10-social-
networking-websites-forums-october-2009-11099/ (showing that Twitter was the sixth most popular
social networking site in October 2009).
20. LENHART & Fox, supra note 9, at 1.
21. AnitaL. Allen, Dredging up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U.CHi
L. REv. 47, 48 (2008).
22. A more expansive list of social network services or sites could be drawn up. For example,
for some the fact that viewers rate content on YouTube, share opinions about products on
Amazon.com, or rate each other on Ebay.com might qualify these sites as social networks.
23. Doe v. MySpace Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 600 (2008);
see also Liveuniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-6994 AHM CRZx, 2007 WL 6865852
(RZx), at * 1 (C.D. Cal. June 4,2007) ("Social networking websites allow visitors to create personal
profiles containing text, graphics, and videos, as well as to view profiles of their friends and other
users with similar interests."), affd, 304 F. App'x 554 (9th Cir. 2008).
24. danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC'N, at art. 11 (2007), http://jcmc.indiana.
edu/vol 13/issuel/boyd.ellison.html.
25. See About Us, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) ("LinkedIn is
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networking. Second, there are those, such as Bebo26 (a site popular in Europe 27),
MySpace,28 and Facebook which leverage the social or friendship properties
of pre-existing, predominately offline networks of intimates, friends, and
acquaintances.
Boyd and Ellison explain this distinction between networking and networks
as follows:
What makes social network sites unique is not that they allow
individuals to meet strangers, but rather that they enable users to
articulate and make visible their social networks .... [P]articipants are
not necessarily "networking" or looking to meet new people; instead,
they are primarily communicating with people who are already a part of
their extended social network.3"
Thus, a typical Linkedln subscriber seeks to leverage the contacts of contacts
to increase the range of their professional networking. But a Facebook user
primarily seeks to communicate with an existing network of friends. These users
only incidentally (or at least initially), leverage the virtual networks of his or her
friends to identify and then "friend" participating friends from their existing real
world network.3 Empirical data seems to bear out this distinction. Adults use
professional sites sparingly (e.g., 6% of adults use Linkedln), but they use them
almost exclusively for professional purposes. Social network sites such as
Facebook and MySpace see more mixed use, but adults tend to use them far more
an interconnected network of experienced professionals from around the world, representing 150
industries and 200 countries. You can find, be introduced to, and collaborate with qualified
professionals that you need to work with to accomplish your goals.").
26. See bebo.com, About Bebo, http://www.bebo.com/c/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2010)
("Bebo is a popular social networking site which connects you to everyone and everything you care
about. It is your life online-a social experience that helps you discover what's going on with your
world and helps the world discover what's going on with you.").
27. See Geoff Duncan, Bebo Launches Five European Localizations, DIGIALTRENDS, Mar.
16, 2009, http://digitaltrends.com/intemational/bebo-launches-five-european-localizations.
28. See MySpace Quick Tour, http://www.MySpace.com/index.cfn?fuseaction=userTour.
home (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) ("MySpace is a place for friends; MySpace is Your Space;
MySpace keeps you connected.").
29. See Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) ("Facebook helps
you connect and share with the people in your life.").
30. boyd & Ellison, supra note 24.
31. One report notes:
Facebook members seem to be using Facebook as a surveillance tool for maintaining
previous relationships, and as a "social search" tool by which they investigate people
they've met offline. There seems to be little "social browsing," or searching for users
online initially with the intention of moving that relationship offline.
Cliff Lampe et al., A Face(book) in the Crowd: Social Searching vs. Social Browsing, PROC. OF
THE 2006 20TH ANNIVERSARY CONF. ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK (2006),
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=l 180901.
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for social purposes.32
The reason for drawing this admittedly imprecise distinction between the two
types of service is that these uses or functions will tend to drive differential
expectations of privacy, confidentiality, and appropriateness of communications.
It is assumed, for example, that those who participate in true professional
networking services tend to be more guarded and finite in their engagements. In
contrast, those who post or share "what's on [their] mind" on Facebook generally
do so with the expectation that they are communicating with a group of friends,
an extant social group. Although social networking and social network services
function quite similarly, this Article concentrates on the latter group. As such,
it ignores social network sites designed solely for healthcare professionals33 or
those that cater to specific diseases or illnesses.34
A user of a social network site registers with the service and then creates a
profile. This profile functions as the link between the user's real world and
virtual world personas. This profile may include a variety of rich media
including photographs, videos, and links. Typically, the service will have some
kind of search engine that will discover existing real world friends who have a
virtual presence in the social network. Usually, a user can opt-out from being so
discoverable. Once a user identifies someone with whom they wish to virtually
network, they send (e.g., on Facebook) a "friend" request. The network loop is
not established until the putative friend accepts that request.
35
Twitter 6 is similar to the character-limited news feed ("What's on your
mind?") popularized by Facebook. But it differs from other social networks
because its users are less likely to restrict the viewing of their posts to a restricted
group of existing contacts, although that is possible.37 Users of Twitter "tweet"
in bites of up to 140 characters what they are doing or thinking at any particular
time. Other Twitter subscribers may then follow these postings. Thus, those
who are interesting because they are famous, or famous because they are
interesting, have their posts followed by other subscribers, frequently in far larger
numbers than Facebook friends. Thus, Twitter shares characteristics with web
(particularly blog) sites in that it tends to operate as a broadcast or one-to-many
service. As predominantly used, Twitter lacks a key property of other popular
social networks in that the publisher of a message typically will not control who
32. Lenhart, supra note 2, at 6.
33. See, e.g., Sermo, http://www.sermo.com/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
34. See, e.g., PatientsLikeMe, http://www.patientslikeme.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2009);
see Jeana H. Frost & Michael P. Massagli, Social Uses of Personal Health Information Within
PatientsLikeMe, an Online Patient Community: What Can Happen When Patients Have Access
to OneAnother's Data, 10 J.MED. INTERNETRES., at el 5 (2008), http://www.jmir.org/2008/3/e 15/.
35. See generally boyd & Ellison, supra note 24 (describing social networking sites'
procedures for participation).
36. See About Twitter, http://twitter.com/about ("Twitter is a real-time information network
powered by people all around the world that lets you share and discover what's happening now.").
37. Just as it is possible, but less likely, that a user will open his or her Facebook page to the
public.
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can see that post (i.e., it is one-directional rather than bi-directional38); although
it does resemble a service such as Facebook, in that the consumer can choose
whether or not to subscribe to posts from that other user.39
B. Use, Perceptions, and Expectations
Basic Internet communication tools are either limited in their reach or
obvious as to their broadcast nature. Notwithstanding the occasional breakdown
when a user ill advisedly clicks "reply to all" or "reply" on a listserv, email is,
and is perceived to be, a one-to-one communication. In practice, email may be
no more private than sending a postcard through the mail because it could
potentially be read by many, but few postcards are read by unintended recipients.
At the other extreme, the publisher of content to a web page or a traditional blog
should realize that this is a one-to-many broadcast.
In the much-discussed world of Web 2.0, where the creation or sharing of
content by users rather than traditional content publishers is emphasized," online
search, communication, and networking tools allow those online to apply a
virtual overlay to their offline lives. Thus, a user who enters an address into
Google Maps creates a representation of that real place. When that user enables
location services on a mobile device4' and allows the online service to share that
data with others, the user's real and virtual world locations are overlaid.
Similarly, when a user converses on a social network service he or she is
mapping his or her virtual conversation to his or her real network of friends and
acquaintances. Facebook refers to this as "the digital mapping of people's real-
world social connections. 4 2 However, the potential consequences of such virtual
communication are of a different order.
Real world, or offline, communications are beset by inefficiencies and noise
38. See boyd & Ellison, supra note 24.
39. The terrain is further complicated by interactions between these services. For example,
Twitter users can link their "tweets" to Facebook so that they are displayed in Facebook as news
feeds. See Tweeter, Tweeter Is on Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/apps/application.php?id=
16268963069 (last visited July 10, 2009).
40. See Jessi Hempel, Web 2.0 Is So Over. Welcome to Web 3.0, FORTUNE, Jan. 8, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/07/technology/hempel-threepointo.fortune/index.htm; see also
Gunther Eysenbach, Medicine 2.0: Social Networking, Collaboration, Participation,
Apomediation, and Openness, 10 J. MED. INTERNETREs., at e22 (2008), http://www.jmir.org/2008/
3/e22; Benjamin Hughes et al., Health 2.0 and Medicine 2.0: Tensions and Controversies in the
Field, 10 J. MED. INTERNET REs., at e23 (2008), http://www.jmir.org/2008/3/e23/; Rick McLean
et al., The Effect of Web 2.0 on the Future of Medical Practice and Education: Darwikinian
Evolution or Folksonomic Revolution?, 187 MED J. AuSTL. 174, 174 (2007); Tim O'Reilly, What
Is Web 2. 0? Design Patterns andBusiness Models for the Next Generation of Software, O'REILLY,
Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.oreilly.de/artikel/web20.html.
41. See, e.g., Apple, Phone and iPod Touch: Understanding Location Services, http://
support.apple.com/kb/HT1975 (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
42. Facebook, Press Room, http://www.facebook.col/press.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
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that have the effect of limiting the reach of the participants' communications.
The context of the listening group43 will, or should, modulate the content of the
conversation. Social network services break this paradigm because they
encourage and operationalize the posting of intimate or private moments or
thoughts on the user's news feed, wall, or in a tweet. Services such as Facebook
confuse the communication model for the user and potentially lead to category
breakdown because they offer the opportunity for apparently one-to-one
conversations"4 that are nevertheless open to all in a group (a broadcast context).
This initial category breakdown-or state of pseudo-seclusion-is
exacerbated in online social networks because the smaller, inefficient, and
segregated social categories we tend to have in the real world (relatively distinct
categories of intimates, co-employees, co-professionals, etc.) may become
blurred when we create larger aggregated friend groups from several categories.
For example, a Facebook user's network of friends likely will start with a small
number of intimates. As the social network service's tools for finding friends are
used,45 the properties of the friended group may have changed dramatically to
include co-workers, employers, or customers.
It may be the case that users of social network sites are "quite oblivious,
unconcerned, or just pragmatic about their personal privacy." '46 Equally, such
users may be willing to trade their private information knowingly, usually only
shared with intimates, in order to increase their number of friends and build new
online or offline relationships.47 In their study of information sharing on
Facebook, Gross and Acquisti examined the tenuous application of social
network theory4" to online networks. As they observed, although offline social
networks may consist of extremely diverse relationships from intimates to
acquaintances, online networks can "reduce these nuanced connections to
simplistic binary relations: 'Friend or not."4 Although the context changes as
43. For example, an audience of intimates or co-workers around the water-cooler would be
a listening group.
44. An example of this would be a wall comment.
45. Examples of friend finding tools include Facebook's ability to allow users to data mine
one's Gmail address book or "friending" mere acquaintances who are friends of friends.
46. Ralph Gross& Alessandro Acquisti, Information Revelation andPrivacy in Online Social
Networks (The Facebook Case), (ACM) WORKSHOP IN PRIVACY IN ELECTRONIC Soc'Y 71, § 4
(2005).
47. See, e.g., Catherine Dwyer et al., Trust and Privacy Concern Within Social Networking
Sites: A Comparison ofFacebookandMySpace, AMS. CONF. ON INFO. SYSTEMS 2007 PRoC., Paper
339, http://aisel.aisnet.org/ameis2007/339.
48. This sociological construct identifies the properties of social relationships as "nodes" and
"ties" and the relative strengths (e.g., weak or strong) of the latter. See Social Network, in
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialnetwork.
49. Gross & Acquisti, supra note 46, § 2.1 (quoting d. boyd, Friendster and Publicly
Articulated Social Networking, in 2004 CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS & COMPUTING SYS.) As
discussed below, Facebook now permits disaggregation of "friends" into multiple categories that
can then be set with different permissions. However, there is no indication yet as to how many
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the user moves from offline to online discourse and data sharing, the user may
not be fully aware of the category blurring and fail to appropriately modulate the
content.
Social network services also impact how users interact with their posted data
or content due to a shift from taxonomy, top-down indexing by experts or content
owners, to folksonomy (bottom-up indexing or "social tagging" by users)."
Consider the participant in our water cooler conversation who shows a recent
photograph to the other participants. Our participant likely will contextualize the
image (e.g., "last weekend-a quiet celebration with friends"). This taxonomy (or
metadata) will exclusively index that image for the other participants. Now,
consider the same image uploaded to the participant's social network site.
Because the site allows tagging of content by other users, folksonomy, the
content owner loses exclusive control of the indexing of the image. Now, a
"friend" may tag (add metadata to) the image (say, by adding information as to
the identity of other participants) or comment on it. Thus, an image that was
benign in the water-cooler setting may be re-indexed by other users (e.g., "drunk
at medical school reunion;" or "so, that's why you missed work"). As follows
from the discussion above, this re-indexing occurs in a context that allows
broadcast to a much larger group consisting of multiple offline but aggregated
online social categories.
C. Social Network Privacy and Security Settings
Most social network services provide tools for making data or
communications less public. Facebook allows users to choose which information
to include in their profiles and limit which users can see that information.5
MySpace and Twitter similarly allow users to control who can see their profile
information.52 Appropriately risk-averse users may also choose to opt out of the
popular social network sites and only post on networks restricted to other
licensed physicians.53 Indeed, users with multiple profiles tend to create them on
different sites. Of social network site users who have multiple profiles, 25% do
so in order to disaggregate their followers, for example by keeping professional
users opt to use this feature.
50. See, e.g., Daniel H. Pink, Folksonomy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 11,2005, at 69, available
athttp://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/1 /magazine/l I ideas 1-21 .html?_r=z; J. Trant, Studying Social
Tagging and Folksonomy: A Review and Framework, 10 J. DIGITAL INF. (2009); see also McLean
et al., supra note 40, at 175.
51. Facebook, Facebook's Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.conpolicy.php (last visited
Dec. 28, 2009).
52. See MySpace, About Settings, http://www.myspace.com/Modules/ContentManagement/
Pages/page.aspx?placement=privacysettings, (last visited Oct. 10, 2009); Welcome to Twitter
Support!, http://help.twitter.com/portal (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
53. See, e.g., Sermo, http://www.sermo.com (last visited Dec. 28, 2009). "Sermo uses a
proprietary technology to verify physicians' credentials in real-time." Get to Know Sermo,
http://www.sermo.com/about/introduction (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
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relationships on one site and personal ones on another.54
Popular social network sites offer an array of privacy and security strategies.
For example, by using included private modes of communication, users can
initiate secure communication without adjusting privacy settings at all. Thus,
Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter allow for private messages to be exchanged
directly between users," limiting more sensitive conversations to a specific
recipient. Similarly, Facebook allows users to exchange real-time instant
messages that can only be viewed temporarily,56 lessening concerns about
communication records being used later in a negative manner.
Recently distinguishing itself from competitors, Facebook now permits
disaggregation of "friends" into multiple categories that can then be set with
different permissions.57 Utilizing this feature should allow a user to enjoy more
relaxed security settings with intimates while benefiting from tightened privacy
control for professional contacts.58 Simply educating users about these settings
can radically reduce exposure of private or semi-private information. For
example, the authors of the Florida medical student and resident survey discussed
below59 reported that, "telling students to increase their privacy settings on
Facebook yielded an 80% reduction in publicly visible accounts."60
However, such risk management strategies are seriously under-utilized
because so few users change the "open" default privacy and security settings on
social network sites.6 A study conducted by MIT students found that over 70%
of the Facebook profiles examined were open to the public.62 This is an alarming
number when considering that a Pew study found that "47% of internet users
54. Lenhart, supra note 2, at 8.
55. Facebook Help Center: Messages and Inbox, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=real-
time406#!/help.php?page=938 (last visited Feb. 8, 2010); see also MySpace, Can You Send
Messages to Several Friends at a Time?, http://faq.myspace.com/app/answers/detail/a-id/262/
kw/myspace%2Omail/c/%20/r-id/ 100061, (last visited Oct. 11, 2009); Twitter Support,
http://help.twitter.com/portal, (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
56. Facebook Help Center: Chat: How to Use the Chat Feature, http://www.facebook.com/
help.php?page=824 (follow "How do I delete or look through my chat history? Is it saved
permanently?" hyperlink), (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) ("You cannot view older conversations or
conversations with friends who are not currently online.").
57. See also Posting of Alison Driscoll to Mashable: The Social Media Guide,
http://mashable.com/2009/04/28/facebook-privacy-settings/ (Apr. 28, 2009).
58. See generally Posting of Marshall Kirkpatrick to ReadWriteWeb, http://www.
readwriteweb.com/archives/acloser-look-at-facebooks-new_privacyoptions.php (June 29,2009,
12:37).
59. See infra text accompanying note 267.
60. L.A. Thompson et al., AuthorReply, J. GEN. INTERNALMED. 2156,2156 (2008) (citation
omitted).
61. Compare Gross & Acquisti, supra note 46, § 5, with Lenhart, supra note 2, at 9 (reporting
sixty percent of adult users restrict access to their profiles to friends).
62. Harvey Jones & Jos6 Hiram Soltren, Facebook: Threats to Privacy 13 (2005),
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/student-papers/fall05-papers/facebook.pdf.
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look online for information about doctors."63  Further, the MIT study was
conducted by using software to automatically examine the information available
in user profiles.' Even temporarily unsecured profiles have the potential of
being subject to mass data collection, putting users at risk of having their
information permanently stored by third-party data aggregators. 5
Even proper and consistent use of privacy or security settings has some
limitations. Needless to say, such privacy and security settings may, as with any
other type of online data storage, be defeated by hackers.66 However, social
network sites are not subject to the same comprehensive security requirements
as HIPAA mandates for healthcare entities. 67 More importantly, data that is de-
identified or rendered pseudonymous may be re-identified if the user has the
same profile picture or other demographic data both on one secure and another
insecure profile.68 Users may also defeat the purpose of privacy controls by
exercising poor judgment in choosing whom to "friend."69 For example, a user
could have a secured profile but post a comment on another user's public profile
that anyone can see.
Ultimately the solution to many but not all of the issues discussed in this
article will themselves be technological. Larry Lessig's view of code, or system,
architecture holds true here, and suggests that features of the architecture of
social network sites will "constrain some behavior by making other behavior
possible, or impossible."7 Changes in the privacy and security settings of
Facebook and other social networking sites will likely be the most efficient
"regulation" of these issues, certainly more efficient than case-by-case
application of the law of boundaries. As the potential for employment or the
availability of health insurance are publicly seen as dependent on more
responsible online behavior, so the demand for better architecture will increase,
as will its utilization, and the spiral will continue until only outlying scenarios
63. Susannah Fox & Sydney Jones, The Social Life of Health Information, PEW INTERNET
& AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 35 (2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/
2009/PIP_ Health 2009.pdf.
64. Jones & Soltren, supra note 62, at 11.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Brad Stone, Twitter Hack Raises Flags on Security, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15,2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/technology/internet/16twitter.html?ref=-
technology; Posting of Chris Dannen to Fast Company.con, http://www.fastcompany.
com/blog/chris-dannen/techwatch/10-questions-answered-facebook-attacks (May 15,200912:30).
Hacking of social network sites (or even government surveillance of same) is outside the terms of
reference of this article. In such cases statutory protections involving criminal and civil liability
may apply, for example, under the Electronic Communications PrivacyAct of 1986. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (2006).
67. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2009).
68. Gross & Acquisti, supra note 46, § 4.2.
69. See Jones & Soltren, supra note 62, at 20 (explaining that their study found 28.7% of
Facebook users "friend strangers on occasion").
70. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 89 (1999).
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remain.
In parallel to architectural evolution facilitated by code innovation and
prompted by market pressures from competitors or consumers, social network
services may find themselves subject to low levels of what Anita Allen has, in
analogous situations, termed state "coercion. ', 71 Thus, the FTC could exert
marginal coercion by opening an investigation into social networking site
defaults or, as is happening in Canada, apply additional yet still minimal coercion
by demanding specific changes to the sites' settings.72
Whatever the drivers, changes in architecture clearly are foreseeable but are
likely to be incremental. The fact that regulation of the physician-patient
relationship and the protection of patient information are so entrenched in our
health law models (common law, statute, constitutional law, command-control,
ethical codes, etc.) makes it unlikely that courts and regulators will wait too long
for better "code."
II. THE LEGAL (AND NOT So LEGAL) FRAMEWORK
There are a multitude of emerging legal issues surrounding social network
sites and the vast amounts of data contained on them. For example, social
network data is of interest to anti-terrorist agencies in much the same way as
email and telephone archives;73 an Australian court allowed lawyers to serve
notice of a default judgment via Facebook on two borrowers who had defaulted
on a loan;74 and social network postings have come under scrutiny in cases of
jurors apparently researching and discussing cases on Twitter and Facebook.75
71. See Anita L. Allen, Unpopular Privacy: The Case for Government Mandates, 32 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REv. 87, 96-98 (2007) (discussing FTC regulation of telemarketing calls through the
National Do Not Call Registry).
72. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Privacy Comm'r of Can., Facebook Needs to
Improve Privacy Practices, Investigation Finds (July 16,2009), available at http://www.priv.gc.ca/
media/nr-c/2009/nr-c_090716_e.cfn. Facebook responded with proposed changes to its policies
and code; see Posting of Claire Cain Miller to Bits, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/
facebook-moves-to-improve-privacy-and-transparency (Aug. 27, 2009, 13:52 EST).
73. See, e.g., Social Network Sites 'Monitored', BBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 25 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/politics/7962631.stm (discussing telecommunications data
retention under European Union directive).
74. Noel Towell, Lawyers to Serve Notices on Facebook, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec.
16, 2008, http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/biztech/lawyers-to-serve-notices-on-
facebook/2008/12/16/1229189579001 .html.
75. John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html; Scott Michels,
Cases Challenged over 'Tweeting'Jurors: Lawyers Say They Will Appeal Verdicts After Jurors
Comment on Facebook, Twitter, ABC NEWS, Mar. 17, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/
Story?id=7095018&page = 1; Facebook, Twitter Throw USLegal System into Disarray, ABCNEWS
(Australia), Mar. 18,2009, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/03/18/2520009.htm; see also
Kate Moser, Court Lays Down Law on Jury Internet Use, RECORDER, Sept. 9, 2009,
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Even the status of the very media and data uploaded to social network sites is
somewhat uncertain. For example, in February 2009 Facebook changed its terms
of use, and for the first time suggested that it had persisting rights in some user-
submitted content.76 Although Facebook changed back to its earlier terms of
use,77 even under the current terms of use some user-uploaded content may
persist (when shared with other subscribers or in back-ups) even when deleted
by the user.78
This Article concentrates on just one risk-laden aspect of the use of such
networks-the potential for category breakdown between social and healthcare
professional uses and its implication for social and professional data. Given that
we are concerned primarily with private actors (users of social network sites and
those who would view, process, or aggregate user data), the reflexive response
is to turn to the Law of Boundaries as the exclusive legal model. Within this
concept, the common law of privacy governs social boundaries, while a more
complex set of common law, ethical, and regulatory provisions governs
professional boundaries. As will be seen, this intuitive response translates into
an accurate picture of both the legal structures most likely to be applicable and
the legal protection choices of those dissatisfied with treatment of their social
network data. But the Law of Boundaries does not provide the exclusive options
for dealing with category breakdown. Other options are present that may prove
more or less attractive as these (and related) online interactions develop.
http://www.law.com/flat/Itn/ 1202433656715.html (describing proposed San Francisco Superior
Court rule on subject).
76. Brian Stelter, Facebook's Users Ask Who Owns Information, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,2009,
at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/technology/internet/17facebook.html.
77. Facebook Backs Down, Reverses on User Information Policy, CNN.coM, Feb. 18,2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/02/18/facebook.reversal/index.html.
78. Facebook, Statement ofRights andResponsibilities, http://www.facebook.conVm/terms.php.
2. Sharing Your Content and Information
You own all of the content and information you post on Facebook, and you can control
how it is shared through your privacy and application settings. In addition:
1. For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos and
videos ("IP content"), you specifically give us the following permission,
subject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive,
transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP
content that you post on or in connection with Facebook ("IP License"). This
IP License ends when you delete your IfP content or your account unless your
content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted it.
2. When you delete IP content, it is deleted in a manner similar to emptying
the recycle bin on a computer. However, you understand that removed
content may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of time (but will
not be available to others).
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A. Options: Property, Liability, Inalienability, and Soft Law
The conventional wisdom is that interests in personal health data are
protected by liability not property rules. Thus, health information is not directly
protected as, for example, an intellectual property system might wall-off some
scientific data. Rather, the law of boundaries (HIPAA included) places
behavioral limits on those who would obtain or who are entrusted with health
information.79 Even some data protection rules that appear to flirt with property,
such as rules that exclude regulation of de-identified personal health data,8" are
better understood as liability rules that provide safe harbors for data custodians
who behave in certain ways."
There are compelling arguments that property rules are underused in
protecting personally identifiable information.82 However, of more practical
interest in the context of this article is the opening of a "third front," in addition
to property or liability constructs: the option of protecting personal information
on social networks with some form of inalienability rule.83
Stated broadly inalienability denotes non-transferability of an entitlement
(herein personally identifiable data) even with (the data subject's) consent. Here
Margaret Jane Radin's unpacking of inalienability is helpful as is her
identification of "market-inalienability" that "places some things outside the
marketplace but not outside the realm of social intercourse."'  With a targeted
inalienability regime it is possible to avoid the on (property) and sometimes off
(liability) approaches to tradability in personal information. Specifically, we can
impose bright line rules that target specific would-be uses or users of the data.
Recent developments in health information regulation suggest a growing
interest in this targeted approach. For example, the recently-enacted federal
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH)"5 provides for market inalienability regarding information contained
79. See generally NICOLAS P. TERRY, LEGAL ISSUES RELATED To DATA ACCESS, POOLING,
AND USE IN HEALTHCARE DATA IN PUBLIC GOOD OR PRIVATE PROPERTY? Ch. 4 (National Institutes
of Health, forthcoming 2010).
80. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009) (defining protected health information as that which
is "individually identifiable").
81. See, e.g., id. § 164.514(e)(3)(i) (de-identifying the data or complying with "limited data
set" rules).
82. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (dissecting the inapplicability of property as itself conclusory of the
property and liberty rhetoric of those who would trade in the data of others).
83. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Paul M. Schwartz, Property,
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2055 (2004).
84. Radin, supra note 83, at 1853.
85. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
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in a patient's electronic medical record.86 Similarly, a handful of states have
targeted specific uses of prescribing information collected by data aggregators
on behalf of pharmaceutical manufacturers desirous of more efficient marketing
of their drugs to physicians.87 The data aggregators initially were successful in
arguing that such statutes violated their commercial speech rights.8 However,
the First Circuit recently validated the regulatory approach when it characterized
the limited target prohibition in the New Hampshire statute as restricting
conduct, not speech. 89
Moving forward, inalienability models are useful if we end up concluding
that we want to wall-off the social network playground in a less extreme or more
targeted manner than by using the Law of Boundaries. Inalienability rules could
prohibit the acquisition of some online information by identified cohorts (for
example, health insurers) or particular uses of such data (for example,
employment-related decisions). 9°
Finally, in examining the palette of options for dealing with the interaction
of social network information and the physician-patient relationship, we must
consider soft law models of regulation. Soft law is notoriously difficult to
define.9" Previously discussed architectural or code approaches to data protection
driven by standards bodies or industry associations likely would qualify for the
soft law description. But in the present context the most important sources of
non-legal, soft regulation are professional ethics codes; provisions of which will
inform the discussion that follows.
Inalienability rules and soft law may not operate in series with liability rules
(such as the Law of Boundaries). Just as common law rules tend to exhibit
cycles of on/off switches punctuated by exceptionalism, 92 so highly targeted
inalienability or soft law rules may occupy a transitional space while courts
determine longer-term entitlements. Equally, narrowly constructed inalienability
rules that are consistent with emerging architectural and soft law constructs in,
say, being increasingly protective of social network data likely will propel the
86. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
17935(d) (effective Feb. 17, 2010).
87. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f(2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 22 § 1711 -E
(Supp. 2009).
88. See, e.g., IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007), rev'd and
vacated, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Me.
2008).
89. See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2864 (2009).
90. See, e.g., Dina Epstein, Have I Been Googled?: Character and Fitness in the Age of
Google, Facebook, and YouTube, 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 715,727 (2008) (arguing that the ABA
should outlaw consideration of social network data for character and fitness determinations).
91. See, e.g., Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. CoMP. L. 499, 500-01
(2006).
92. See Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 717, 736-38 (1993), building
on EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-27 (1949).
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courts utilizing conventional boundary law mechanisms towards a similarly
protective stance.
B. The Law of Boundaries: Privacy Torts and Breach of Confidence
The Restatement's black-letter law of privacy fails to provide any general or
comprehensive right of privacy. Rather, the common law of privacy consists of
a group of nominate, discrete, and limited tort causes of action, somewhat
unconvincingly bundled together in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.93
Most jurisdictions recognize four causes of action for invasion of privacy:
intrusion, public disclosure (or publicity) of private facts, false light, and
appropriation (or exploitation) of another's name.94 In the context of this article
the intrusion and publicity torts are of most importance.95
Both the intrusion and publicity torts are collection-centric. That is, they
provide for legal disincentives to the collection or exploitation of private
information. The intrusion tort focuses on the manner of acquisition of the
information while the publicity tort focuses on the content of the information.
9 6
In contrast, the action for breach of confidence recognized in mostjurisdictions97
is disclosure-centric and focuses on the underlying relational source of the
information.9"
Today courts tend to view the privacy tort as one of public disclosure of
embarrassing facts.99 As such it appears to have more in common with the
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-6521 (1977); see, e.g., Reid v. Pierce
County, 961 P.2d 333, 339 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (adopting § 652).
94. See Reid, 961 P.2d at 338-39; Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 795 (Me.
1976); Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
95. Of least importance in the context of this article are the "appropriation" (§ 652C) and
"false light" torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652C, 652E. Additionally, not all
jurisdictions recognize the "false light" action primarily because it is somewhat duplicative of the
tort of defamation. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1113 (Fla. 2008). But see
Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (joining majority of
jurisdictions in recognizing "false light" claim and navigating overlap with defamation). Although
not of particular relevance to the issues discussed herein, it is likely we will see considerable
appropriation litigation regarding social network sites. See, e.g., Web 2.0 Convergence,
http://www.digitalcommunitiesblogs.com/web20convergence/2009/06/social-media-fraud-on-
the-incr.php (June 8, 2009 14:32) (discussing impersonation of media and athletic personalities in
twitter feeds).
96. See Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 1426, 1441 (1982) (making a content-source distinction).
97. Cf Meade v. Orthopedic Assocs. of Windham County, No. CV064005043, 2007 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 3424, at *14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2007) (declining to recognize cause of
action for breach of confidence).
98. See, e.g., Burger v. Blair Med. Assocs., Inc., 964 A.2d 374, 378 (Pa. 2009); McCormick
v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431,435 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
99. Stratton v. Krywko, No. 248669,2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 23, at *11 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan.
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disclosure-centric confidentiality duty than the collection-centric intrusion tort.
But it remains collection-centric side of the line because of its predicate that the
defendant acquired private, embarrassing facts about the plaintiff before
disclosure. In contrast, the confidentiality predicate is not one of acquisition by
the defendant-rather, the plaintiff delivered the (typically) private information
to the defendant in the context of a preexisting, fiduciary relationship.
Based as they are on underlying, preexisting relationships, breach of
confidence actions are heavily dependent on context and the properties of the
underlying relationship. In the context of the physician-patient relationship and
the data entrusted in that context, the breach of confidence actions discussed
below are variously based on responsibilities imposed by licensing statutes, the
physician's evidentiary privilege, common law principles of trust, the
Hippocratic Oath, and general principles of medical ethics.'
1. Intrusion upon Seclusion.-The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) describes the
intrusion upon seclusion tort as follows: "One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."'' Today,
courts require the satisfaction of four elements: (1) an unauthorized intrusion or
prying into plaintiffs seclusion; (2) the intrusion is highly offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the matter upon which the intrusion
occurs must be private; and (4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering. 1
02
The intrusion tort originally required a literal, physical intrusion; this is no
longer the case. Courts now tend to look less at the physicality of the defendant's
action and more at the level of its offensiveness.0 3 The foundation of the action
6, 2005).
100. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 590-91 (D.C. 1985).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1966); see also id. § 652B cmts. a, b:
a. The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not depend upon any
publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs. It consists
solely of an intentional interference with his interest in solitude or seclusion, either as
to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable man.
b. The invasion may be by .... some other form of investigation or examination into
his private concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or
his wallet, examining his private bank account ....
102. See, e.g., Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ill.
1989) (recognizing requirement that intrusion must be "highly" offensive); Schmidt v. Ameritech
Ill., 768 N.E.2d 303, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); see also Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 588 (requiring
showing that intrusion be "highly offensive"); Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).
103. See, e.g., Bonanno v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet, No. CV 99066602, 2000 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 287, at *4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2000). See generally Goodrich v. Waterbury
Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317 (Conn. 1982); Johns v. Firstar Bank, No. 2004-CA-001558-
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remains an "intentional and unwarranted acquisition by the defendant.""
A "wrongful intrusion may occur in a public place, so long as the thing into
which there is intrusion or prying is entitled to be private."' 5  "However,
generally, the observation of another person's activities, when that other person
is exposed to the public view, is not actionable .. ."'06 Thus, training a
surveillance camera on the outside of a house likely will not be an intrusion. 7
However, observing people through holes poked in the ceiling of a restroom,0 8
or by use of a camera installed in a medical examination room,"0 9 clearly satisfy
the element.
As the courts' understanding of an actionable intrusion has become more
existential, their approach has become more nuanced. In the words of one court:
"Assuming that the matter is entitled to be private, then the court will consider
two primary factors in determining whether an intrusion is actionable: (1) the
means used, and (2) the defendant's purpose for obtaining the information.""' 0
In general, contrasting sharply with other boundary torts, "[i]ntrusion into
solitude appears to be based on the manner in which a defendant obtains
information, and not what a defendant later does with the information."''
2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts.-The publicity tort, targeting those
who give "publicity to a matter concerning the private life""' 2 of the plaintiff,
applies to "[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another"'1 3 if the data "(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."' " Modem courts state a granular
version of the doctrine as requiring:
(1) the fact or facts disclosed must be private in nature; (2) the disclosure
must be made to the public; (3) the disclosure must be one which would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person; (4) the fact or facts disclosed
cannot be of legitimate concern to the public; and (5) the defendant acted
with reckless disregard of the private nature of the fact or facts
disclosed.' '5
A key distinction between the intrusion and publicity causes of action is that
MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 85, at *7-9 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2006).
104. Burger v. Blair Med. Assocs., Inc., 964 A.2d 374, 379 (Pa. 2009).
105. Martin v. Patterson, 975 So. 2d 984, 994 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (citations omitted).
106. Johnson v. Stewart, 854 So. 2d 544, 549 (Ala. 2002) (citing I.C.U. Investigations, Inc.
v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 2000)).
107. Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d 323, 327-29 (I11. App. Ct. 2005).
108. See Benitez v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 714 N.E.2d 1002, 1033-34 (I1l. App. Ct. 1999).
109. Acuffv. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919-21 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
110. Martin, 975 So. 2d at 994 (citations omitted).
111. Fernandez-Wells v. Beauvais, 983 P.2d 1006, 1010 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 379 (Colo. 1997).
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although the former "requires no showing of publication or publicity," '116 the
publicity action rotates around the public disclosure of private facts."'
3. Breach of Confidence.-The privacy torts closely resemble intentional
torts such as outrage," 18 in that they rotate around intentional interferences'19 that
are "highly offensive to a reasonable person."'"2 In contrast, the breach of
confidence tort is essentially a strict liability action,'2 ' as befits a tort claim that
has its roots in implied contract and fiduciary duties. 22
Confidentiality, or rather the tort of breach of confidence, is disclosure-
centric. The breach of confidence tort applies only to those who have been
entrusted with information in confidence.'23 Accordingly:
The [fiduciary or confidential] relationship arises when one person
reposes special trust and confidence in another person and that other
person-the fiduciary-undertakes to assume responsibility for the
affairs of the other party. The person upon whom the trust and
confidence is imposed is under a duty to act for and to give advice for
the benefit of the other person on matters within the scope of the
relationship. Fiduciary duties are the highest standard of duty imposed
by law.'24
It follows that "only one who holds information in confidence can be charged
with a breach of confidence,"'25 while "an act [that] qualifies as a tortious
invasion of privacy, it theoretically could be committed by anyone." '126 The
converse is true; if information that is not secret or private is entrusted in
116. Corcoran v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); see also
Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (111. 1989) ("The basis of the tort is not
publication or publicity. Rather, the core of this tort is the offensive prying into the private domain
of another.").
117. See, e.g., Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 419 (8th Cir. 1978) (requiring
"disclosure to the general public or likely to reach the general public").
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 46 (1965).
119. See, e.g., Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)
(requiring plaintiff allege that defendant acted with "knowledge of or with reckless disregard").
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
121. See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985).
122. See generally Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (noting
that the physician-patient relationship includes a fiduciary character component); Overstreet v.
TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 631-32 (Tenn. 2008) (discussing covenants of
confidentiality for contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law); McCormick v. England,
494 S.E.2d 431,434 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing modem tort law basis of action).
123. See, e.g., Johns v. Firstar Bank, No. 2004-CA-001558MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 85, at
*8-9 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2006) (finding that privacy torts are not applicable to a case where
plaintiff disclosed information to defendant; any action would have to lie in breach of confidence).
124. Overstreet, 256 S.W.3d at 641-42 (Koch, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
125. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1985) (en banc).
126. Id.
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confidence, its subsequent disclosure may be actionable.'27 Although there can
be overlap, "neither of the torts of invasion of privacy nor breach of
confidentiality is entirely subsumed within the other."'
' 21
The breach of confidence tort not only is a stricter form of liability than
privacy theories, but also eschews the defensive arguments available in the latter.
For example, "[a] defendant is not released from an obligation of confidence
merely because the information learned constitutes a matter of legitimate public
interest."'' 29
C. Privacy Expectations and Social Networks
Obviously privacy policies do not protect social network subscribers from
legal process.' Increasingly, and as happened with email, social network
subscribers' private profile pages are drawn into public processes through
subpoena or discovery.' For example, there have been media reports of
prosecutors using photographs posted on defendants' social network sites to
bolster their arguments in sentencing hearings.' Indeed, a growing number of
cases involve discovery or related procedural requests by defendants.'
Representative fact-patterns include workplace sexual harassment claims, where
the defendant argues that the plaintiff consensually engaged in similar behaviors
online,"3 4 and any number of cases where the defense seeks to make an issue out
of the social network subscriber's emotional state.'
127. See id. at 528.
128. Burger v. Blair Med. Assocs., Inc., 964 A.2d 374, 381 (Pa. 2009).
129. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985) (citing
Vickery, supra note 96, at 1468).
130. See, e.g., Facebook's Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited
Dec. 30, 2009) ("We may disclose information pursuant to subpoenas, court orders... if we have
a good faith belief that the response is required by law.").
131. See, e.g., Ronald J. Levine & Susan L. Swatski-Lebson, Are Social Networking Sites
Discoverable?, PRODUCT LIABImrry L. & STRATEGY, Nov. 13, 2008, available at http://www.law.
com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jsp?id=1202425974937.
132. See Associated Press, Facebook Evidence Sends Unrepentant Partier to Prison, Fox
NEWS.COM, July 21, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,386241,00.html.
133. See generally Carole Levitt & Mark Rosch, How Lawyers Can Mine a Social Network
for Personal Information, 16 NEV. LAW. 12 (2008).
134. See, e.g., Mackelprang v. Fid. Nat'l Title Agency ofNev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-
GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2379, at *8-9 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007).
135. See, e.g., Mary Pat Gallagher, MySpace, Facebook Pages Called Key to Dispute Over
Insurance Coverage for Eating Disorders, 191 N.J.L.J. 309, Feb. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005559933 (discussing Beye v.
Horizon and Foley v. Horizon, in which defendant's health insurer argued that access to social
network pages could assist in a defense for denial of coverage for anorexia or bulimia because
conditions were emotionally rather than biologically caused); Henry Gottlieb, MySpace, Facebook
Privacy Limits Tested in Emotional Distress Suit, 188 N.J.L.J. 845, June 14, 2007, available at
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In such cases the exact legal status of social network content vis-t-vis user
expectations tends to be obscured by proceedings that depend in large part on
highly individualized facts and trial court discretion. Only occasionally have
courts dealt directly with a social network user's expectations of those who can
see their posts, or the more complex legal question of the user's privacy
expectations.
A.B. v. State 16 concerned a juvenile who posted a vulgar tirade against her
ex-middle school principal on a MySpace page. That page was on a profile
falsified as the principal's but actually created by one of the defendant's
friends.'37 A total of twenty-six friends including the defendant were given
access to the fake profile. 3 ' At trial the defendant was adjudicated a delinquent
child on the basis that, if she had been an adult at the time of the crime, she
would have committed the statutory offense of harassment.'39 The requisite
intent for the harassment offense in question included "a subjective expectation
that the offending conduct will likely come to the attention of the person targeted
for the harassment."' 40 Given the sparse record, the prosecution's reasonable
doubt burden, and a lack of any independent evidence as to the workings of the
social network site, the court reversed the adjudication.' 4 ' Specifically, the court
determined that there was no probative evidence that the defendant, who posted
to a limited group of friends rather than the public, had the requisite expectation
that the act would come to the principal's intention. 42
In Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., a college student posted comments
critical of her hometown on her MySpace site. Although she removed the
posting six days later, the post had already been copied to her hometown's
newspaper for republication.' 44 She sued the newspaper and her high school
principal who had transmitted the posting to a reporter for, inter alia, breach of
privacy.'45 Citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n,'46 the Supreme
Court of California's most recent guide, the court noted that such a claim "is not
'so much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define one's circle of
http://www.law.com/jsp/LawArticleFriendly-jsp?id (discussing T. V. v. Union Township Board of
Education, defendant school district sought access to social networks pages to potentially challenge
plaintiffs credibility in an action for emotional injuries).
136. 885 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2008).
137. Id. at 1225.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1223-25.
140. Id. at 1226.
141. Id. at 1228.
142. Id. at 1227-28. The court seemed less sure about how to deal with another posting by the
defendant on a different, public MySpace profile page, but ultimately found the evidence wanting
as to intent. Id.
143. 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858 (Ct. App. 2009).
144. Id. at 861.
145. Id.
146. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
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intimacy-to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask."" 47 The Moreno
court concluded:
[The plaintiff] publicized her opinions . . by posting . . .on
myspace.com, a hugely popular intemet site. [Her] affirmative act made
her article available to any person with a computer and thus opened it to
the public eye. Under these circumstances, no reasonable person would
have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published material.
141
The opinion does not state whether the plaintiff had set her MySpace privacy
settings to restrict access to her site to her approved "friends." As it stands, the
opinion seems to suggest that simply posting to a social network site defeats the
expectation of privacy; a position that is challenged below.
49
D. Privacy and Confidentiality in Healthcare
The privacy and confidentiality rules applied to healthcare providers and to
some patient information are both more complex and more granular. At common
law, the collection-centric privacy tort is represented by a relatively small
collection of cases that suggest healthcare provider liability will be restricted to
a narrow range of outlying fact situations. Such a state is unsurprising given that
the privacy torts lack any unifying concept and have failed to develop robust,
plaintiff-friendly doctrine.
Consider, for example, the classic case of Knight v. Penobscot Bay Medical
Center.5 A nurse's husband arrived at a hospital to pick her up.' 5 ' "To give
[him] something interesting to do while he" waited, the husband was gowned and
permitted to observe a stranger's labor and delivery.' Notwithstanding the
rather obvious nature of this intrusion, the plaintiffs cause of action failed
because there was no evidence that the nurse's husband had intended the
intrusion into the patient's seclusion.'53
147. Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863 (quoting M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d
504, 511 (Ct. App. 2001)). Hill also analyzed the privacy tort rights as follows:
Each of the four categories of common law invasion of privacy identifies a distinct
interest associated with an individual's control of the process or products of his or her
personal life. To the extent there is a common denominator among them, it appears to
be improper interference (usually by means of observation or communication) with
aspects of life consigned to the realm of the "personal and confidential" by strong and
widely shared social norms.
Hill, 865 P.2d at 647.
148. Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862.
149. See text accompanying infra notes 323-29.
150. 420 A.2d 915 (Me. 1980).
151. Id. at 916-17.
152. Id. at 917.
153. Id. at 918; see also Fisher v. Dep't of Health, 106 P.3d 836, 840 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
(requiring a "deliberate intrusion"); Kindschi v. City of Meriden, No. CV064022391, 2006 Conn.
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Similar limitations that are instructive on the application of the privacy torts
to social network scenarios derive from the torts' offensiveness and privacy
expectation limitations. Take, for example, Adamski v. Johnson,'54 a case that
involved intrusion and publicity allegations by the plaintiff against her employer.
Plaintiff provided her employer with notice that she would be undergoing
surgery, but when asked she refused to supply additional information about the
surgery. 55 Allegedly, her supervisor applied pressure to her co-employees and
acquired that information.'56 The defendants' apparently intentional conduct
notwithstanding, the court granted defendants' demurrer.'57 First, the court did
not view the disclosed information regarding the nature of the surgery as either
an intrusion or public disclosure of private facts that could be "'highly
offensive"' to a reasonable person.'58 Second, the plaintiff's inchoate allegation
that her supervisor relayed the information to others was dismissed on the basis
that it did not allege facts to suggest that the disclosure went beyond a single
person or small group of persons.'59 Third, the plaintiffs own disclosure of the
nature of the surgery to a small group of co-workers reinforced the defense
position that the intrusion was not offensive and rendered the publicity claim
untenable by eliminating her expectation of privacy. 60
Notwithstanding these limitations inherent in the common law doctrines,
there is a considerable body of case law that applies privacy doctrine with some
rigor to medical fact patterns and suggests some legal jeopardy for medical
professionals posting or micro-blogging information about their patients. As
noted as early as 1942 by the Supreme Court of Missouri, "if there is any right
of privacy at all, it should include the right to obtain medical treatment at home
or in a hospital for an individual personal condition (at least if it is not contagious
or dangerous to others) without personal publicity."'' As more recently stated
by a district court in Illinois, "[t]here are few things in life that are more private
than medical treatments and/or examinations.'
16 2
1. Intrusion Actions.-Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt concerned two series
of photographs taken of a patient suffering from cancer of the larynx.' 63 The first
Super. LEXIS 3666, at *8-9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 2006) (requiring an intentional invasion
upon the plaintiff's privacy).
154. 80 Pa. D. & C.4th 69 (Comm. P1. 2006).
155. Id. at 70-71.
156. Id. at 71.
157. Id. at 78.
158. Id. at 74.
159. Id. at 76.
160. Id. at 77; see also Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 878
(8th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintifflost expectation of privacy when she shared information about
a staph infection with co-workers).
161. Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942).
162. Acuffv. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 924 (C.D. I11. 1999).
163. 365 A.2d 792, 793 (Me. 1976).
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series was taken during the patient's treatment and apparently with his consent.1"
A second series was taken as the patient was dying and there was evidence that
the patient objected to the taking of this second set of photographs.'65 The court
reversed the defendant's directed verdict and held that this intrusion claim should
have been submitted to the jury.'66 Although the court recognized "the benefit
to the science of medicine which comes from the making of photographs of the
treatment and of medical abnormalities found in patients,"'67 this could not be
done without the subject's consent.'68
Stratton v. Krywko concerned a plaintiff involved in an automobile
accident.'69 She was taking Prozac and on the night of the accident consumed
alcohol and marijuana. 170 With the consent of emergency services and the local
hospital, a documentary crew was riding with the paramedics who treated the
patient at the scene of the accident and transported her to the emergency room. 71
Plaintiff refused to sign any consent to the filming.'72 In subsequent broadcasts
plaintiff's face was digitally obscured.'73 However, she was referred to by her
first name and her name and address were visible on a report shown in the
video.'74 A physician could be heard referring to her as "[n]o allergies, on
Prozac."' 75 Given that "defendants filmed plaintiff in the emergency room after
she was presented with and explicitly refused to sign the informed consent
release,"' 76 the court held that her intrusion allegation should have been presented
to the jury.'77
Both Berthiaume and Stratton reaffirm the collection-centric nature of the
intrusion action. However, both cases concern the judicial protection of overtly
physical spaces and tell us little about the resolution of potential claims involving
intrusion into a pseudo-secluded space such as a Facebook profile.
2. Publicity Actions.-Whether information is private depends in part on the
type of information and the extent that the subject keeps the information from the
public. Thus, "[s]exual relations... are normally entirely private matters, as are
...many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses, most intimate
personal letters, [and] most details of a man's life in his home."' 78 Indeed,
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 795.
167. Id. at 796.
168. Id. at 796-97.
169. No. 248669, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 23, at "1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2005).
170. Id.
171. Id. at *3.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *3-4.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *22.
177. Id.; see also Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
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"[m]atters concerning a person's medical treatment or condition are also
generally considered private."' 79 Just as the taking of photographs can constitute
an intrusion, 8' so the publicity tort may apply to their distribution. For example,
one court opined, "[w]e fail to see how autopsy photographs of the Plaintiffs'
deceased relatives do not constitute intimate details of the Plaintiffs' lives or are
not facts Plaintiffs do not wish exposed 'before the public gaze."" 8 On the other
hand, "there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff
himself leaves open to the public eye."' 82
The core component of the publicity tort is, not surprisingly, that the
defendant gave publicity to this private information. The relevant RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS comment provides:
it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in this
Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to
a single person or even to a small group of persons. On the other hand,
any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation,
or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any
broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large
audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term
as it is used in this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one
between private and public communication.' 83
In this context, Vassiliades v. Garfinckel 's, Brooks Brothers is instructive.8 4
A patient brought an action against her plastic surgeon for invasion of privacy
(publicity) after the surgeon used "before" and "after" photographs of her (taken
with her consent) in promotional events at a department store and on
television.8 5 Evidence had been offered at trial by the plaintiff that "after
agonizing over losing her youthful appearance and contemplating plastic surgery
for many years, she underwent plastic surgery and kept her surgery secret, telling
only family and very intimate friends."'' 8 6 For the court, there was no touchstone
regarding who had seen the photographs or even whether her name had been
published. Rather "[t]he nature of the publicity ensured that it would reach the
public."'87
This contrasts with Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez'88 The plaintiff's
partner was diagnosed with AIDS and the plaintiff himself was advised to take
179. Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).
180. See Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 793 (Me. 1976).
181. Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 341 (Wash. 1998).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b. (1977).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a. (1977).
184. See 492 A.2d 580, 585 (D.C. 1985).
185. Id. at 584.
186. Id. at 587.
187. Id. at 588.
188. 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997).
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an HIV test. 89 Asking for confidence the plaintiff, an associate at a law firm,
told his law firm president that he was gay, that he needed to be tested, and
wished for some help covering a previously scheduled deposition.'9" One-week
later the plaintiff was terminated, but not before he discovered that the
information had been shared with everyone in the law firm.'9 ' The court reversed
ajury verdict in the plaintiff s favor on a "publicity" count because of a defective
jury instruction; the trial court had required only that the private information be
"published" to another.' As the Colorado Supreme Court concluded, "the
public disclosure requirement renders [defendant] liable for [plaintiff s] invasion
of privacy claim only if [defendant] disclosed [plaintiffs] situation to a large
number of persons or the general public."' 93 As discussed below, Vassiliades and
Ozer are not at odds with each other. Rather, modem courts recognize a more
granular interpretation of the publicity tort. The "publicity" can occur either: (1)
through "private" channels, thus triggering an additional requirement of a
considerable number of recipients; or (2) through a "public" channel, anything
from a sign in a shop window to a television broadcast, in which case there is no
additional numerical touchstone.
94
Given that the action rotates around private facts being made public,
plaintiffs will have weaker cases when there has been some level of self-
disclosure. Stratton v. Krywko, the television documentary case discussed above,
was close to the line.'95 The defendants had successfully argued in their motion
for summary judgment that the information disclosed about the plaintiff (such as
her face, x-ray/cat scan data, status, prognosis, and Prozac prescription) was
already public.' 96 The appellate court agreed with regard to many of the items
(for example, a public street accident, the police report of the accident) although
others (e.g., scans) were not specifically identified during the broadcasts as
hers.' 97 However, the court considered that there was an issue of triable fact
whether her Prozac prescription was known to "everybody" as argued by
defendants or known to only a "select number of close friends and family."'98 As
the court recognized, "[p]laintiff s argument has merit. Disclosing a fact to a
small number of confidants does not equate to making the information public."' 99
Another issue that arises in publicity cases is whether the publicity reaches
the "highly offensive" threshold. This question of offensiveness to a reasonable
person is an issue of fact for the jury. For example, the court in Vassiliades
189. Id. at 373.
190. Id. at 374.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 379.
193. Id.
194. See discussion accompanying infra note 324.
195. No. 248669, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 23 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2005).
196. Id. at *12.
197. Id. at "14.
198. Id. at *15.
199. Id.
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would not substitute its own views for a jury determination that the publication
of "before" and "after" photographs met this test.
200
The publicity tort can be defeated in the case of the qualified "legitimate
public interest in the publication," either at common law or when the First
Amendment is implicated.20 ' Notwithstanding, when balancing out these
interests, courts tend to favor the individual's right to privacy:
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of
information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and
sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a
reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that
he had no concern.20 2
Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co.203 concerned an article in defendant's
magazine that discussed incidents of alleged malpractice committed by the
plaintiff anesthesiologist. The article discussed the plaintiffs history of
psychiatric and related personal problems in making the argument that there had
been a breakdown in the regulatory system.2°  The court affirmed the
defendant's summary judgment on the application of the defense noting "the
legitimate public interest of warning potential future patients, as well as surgeons
and hospitals, of the risks they might encounter in being treated by or in
employing the plaintiff.
20 5
The most difficult issue in these public interest cases is the assessment of the
value of the specific identification. Consider again Stratton v. Krywko, where the
defendants persuaded the trial court that the First Amendment protected their
"Night in the E.R." documentary as newsworthy or educational.2 6 The court
reaffirmed the duality of this inquiry: "not only must the overall subject-matter
be newsworthy, but also the particular facts [regarding the plaintiff] revealed."2 7
On these facts, the court considered summary adjudication to be improper.0'
When dealing with this issue the courts, as noted in Vassiliades, °9 seek a "logical
200. Vassiliades v. Garfinkel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 588 (DC. 1985).
201. Id. at 588-89; see also Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981);
Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 n.8 (Colo. 1997) (discussing First
Amendment's applicability); Fisher v. Dep't of Health, 106 P.3d 836, 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that "the government may have had no legitimate interest in the dissemination of this
private information sufficient to outweigh Ms. Fisher's protected privacy interest. But she must
show that the extent of the dissemination outweighed her own privacy interest").
202. RESTATEMENT (2ND) OF TORTS, § 652D cmt. h (1977).
203. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
204. Id. at 307-08.
205. Id. at 309.
206. Stratton v. Krywko, No. 248669,2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 23, at *15-16 (Mich. Ct. App.
Jan. 6, 2005).
207. Id. at *20.
208. Id.
209. Vassiliades v. Garfinkel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 585 (D.C. 1985).
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nexus" between the legitimate public interest and the particular publicity given
to the plaintiff's private information.210
3. Confidentiality Actions.-As discussed above, the tort action for breach
of confidence is disclosure-centric and dependent on context. There is also a
chronology at play, and as persuasively argued by Leslie Francis, it is a
chronology not a prioritization.21' A patient exercises this right of privacy when
he or she chooses to provide information to a physician; "[i]f it were otherwise,
patients would be reluctant to freely disclose their symptoms and conditions to
their physicians in order to receive proper treatment., 21 2 That information then
ceases to be private vis-A-vis the physician. Thereafter, dissemination of that
information by the physician is limited by the requirement of confidence." 3
"One of the fiduciary duties that a physician assumes when he or she undertakes
to treat a patient is the duty to refrain from disclosing a patient's confidential
health information unless the patient expressly or impliedly consents or unless
the law requires or permits disclosure." '214
The modem trend is to apply a tort-based breach of confidence action
regarding unauthorized disclosure of medical information.21 5 For example, in
Biddle v. Warren General Hospital, the court recognized both healthcare
provider liability for either "unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic
medical information that a physician or hospital has learned within a physician-
patient relationship" 216 or third party liability for "inducing the unauthorized,
unprivileged disclosure of nonpublic medical information."2 7
In enforcing the duty of confidentiality regarding medical information courts
are particularly protective of medical records. 218 For example, in Hageman v.
Southwest General Health Center,2 19 the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed its
holding in Biddle and held a lawyer liable for breach of confidence when she
passed medical records lawfully obtained in a divorce case to a prosecutor in a
related matter.22°
210. Id. at 589-90 (citations omitted).
211. Leslie Pickering Francis, Privacy and Confidentiality: The Importance of Context, 91
MONIST 52, 52-67 (2008).
212. Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 642 (Tenn. 2008)
(citations omitted).
213. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 410 (4th
ed. 1994).
214. Overstreet, 256 S.W.3d at 642 (citations omitted).
215. See McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 437 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
216. 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999).
217. Id. at528.
218. Hageman v. Sw. Gen. Health Ctr., 893 N.E.2d 153, 155-56 (Ohio 2008).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 157-58; see, e.g., Burger v. Blair Med. Assocs., 964 A.2d 374 (Pa. 2009); Jeffrey
H. v. Imai, Tadlock & Keeney, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 918-19 (Ct. App. 2000), overruled in part
by Jacob B. v. County of Shasta, 154 P.3d 1003, 1012 (Cal. 2007); Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728
N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (discussing pharmacy records).
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Although there is no public interest defense to breach of confidence, 221 "a
physician or hospital is privileged to disclose otherwise confidential medical
information in those special situations where disclosure is made in accordance
with a statutory mandate or common-law duty, or where disclosure is necessary
to protect or further a countervailing interest which outweighs the patient's
interest in confidentiality. ,2 22 As with the statutory and regulatory confidentiality
codes discussed below, breach of confidentiality actions can be met by defensive
arguments that the disclosure was compelled by law,223 is in the best interest of
the patient or others,224 or the patient has given express or implied consent to the
disclosure.225
E. Ethical Restraints
Just as system architecture creates a soft law alternative to boundary law or
governmental coercion, so the existing ethical boundaries that hover over the
physician-patient relationship create a soft law approach to modulating the
behaviors of some social network actors.
Basic medical professional ethics structures map quite well to the common
law confidentiality and privacy restraints. Thus, the American Medical
Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics combines its disclosure-centric
requirement of confidence ("The physician should not reveal confidential
information without the express consent of the patient") with the principle's
instrumental justification ("The patient should feel free to make a full disclosure
of information to the physician in order that the physician may most effectively
provide needed services").226 Similarly, the AMA's approach to collection-
centric rules includes an "intrusion"-like privacy principle demanding protection
of patient privacy as it relates to physical [privacy] "which focuses on individuals
and their personal spaces. 22 7  However, the ethical rules also extend to
associational ("family or other intimate relations"), informational ("specific
personal data"), and decisional privacy ("personal choices").228
As discussed above, the legal domain's case-by-case approach to physician-
patient privacy has added few bright line rules to the basic seclusion-intrusion or
related mandates. In contrast, the AMA principles do bright line some specific
fact-patterns.
221. See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985).
222. Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 524.
223. McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 439 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
224. Id.
225. Snavelyv. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 665 S.E.2d 222,225 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied
(Apr. 10, 2009).
226. AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETIcs § 5.05--Confidentiality (2007), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion505.shtml.




2010] LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL NETWORKING 315
Thus, physicians who participate in "interactive online sites that offer email
communication" are expected to adhere to the AMA's guidelines on email. 219 It
might seem that these guidelines would apply only to the email-like features
grafted on to social network sites. However, the AMA opinion could be
interpreted to provide guidelines for broader physician participation online and
so prohibit the establishment of a physician-patient relationship through an
online social network. Further, if a physician-patient relationship already existed
such guidelines would require informed consent as to the limitations and risks
associated with social network communication, and demand a regard for privacy
and confidentiality that may be unattainable in the online social network
context.23°
The AMA ethical guidelines specifically address both contemporaneous and
recorded observation of physician-patient interactions, scenarios that may point
to the correct approach to social network "broadcasts" such as Facebook posts
or Twitter streams. For example, the ethical approach to "outside observers,
23
requires their prior agreement to confidentiality and their presence is conditioned
on "the patient's explicit agreement. '232 Similarly, with regard to filming and
broadcasting encounters, the "educational objective can be achieved ethically by
filming only patients who can consent. 233 Such consent must be obtained for
both the filming and subsequent broadcasting.234 Any such consent must be
informed and thus is predicated on: "[A]n explanation of the educational
purpose of film, potential benefits and harms (such as breaches of privacy and
confidentiality), as well as a clear statement that participation in filming is
voluntary and that the decision will not affect the medical care the patient
receives." '235 Furthermore, the guidelines assume that the filming and broadcast
will be limited to healthcare professionals and their students. If any broader
audience is contemplated, that must be the subject of an additional, explicit
consent.236
The framing of both the provisions on outside observers and filming are
229. Id. § 5.027(3)-Use of Health-Related Online Sites, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion5027.shtml.
230. Id. § 5.026-The Use of Electronic Mail (2008-09), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion5026.shtml.
231. Id. § 5.0591-Patient Privacy and Outside Observers to the Clinical Encounter,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion50591.shtml (defining "outside observers" as "individuals who are present during patient-
physician encounters and are neither members of a health care team nor enrolled in an educational
program for health professionals").
232. Id.
233. Id. § 5.045(1)-(2)--Filming Patients in Health Care Settings, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion5045.shtml.
234. Id.




sufficiently analogous to Internet broadcasting through social network sites that
the additional considerations regarding confidentiality and informed consent are
significant. First, the AMA notes that, "[p]hysicians should avoid situations in
which an outside observer's presence may negatively influence the medical
interaction and compromise care., 237 Second, "physicians should be aware that
filming may affect patient behavior during a clinical encounter. The patient
should be given ample opportunity to discuss concerns about the film, before and
after filming, and a decision to withdraw consent must be respected., 238 Third,
the ethical rules that acknowledge the requirement for explicit consent are based
on the recognition that "filming cannot benefit a patient medically and may cause
harm.
239
F. HIPAA and Related Regulatory Models
Although reasonably well-developed areas of law by the late 1990s, the
breach of confidence tort and related state statutes240 were deemed inadequate to
meet the needs of electronic, interoperable billing, and records systems. Starting
in 2000, therefore, the breach of confidence tort has been supplemented by
HIPAA, a federal confidentiality code (albeit one that is mislabeled as dealing
with "privacy").24'
Today, the HIPAA code is the most important source of regulation regarding
disclosures of patient information by healthcare providers.242 It is not the
exclusive source because HIPAA is quite limited in its reach 243 and only partially
preempts state confidentiality laws.2" Much of the HIPAA regulatory framework
is not directed at protecting patient information but creating the "exceptional"
processes by which such data may be disseminated (such as patient consent) or
creating broad safe harbors for public health, judicial, and regulatory
237. Id. § 5.0591-Patient Privacy and Outside Observers to the Clinical Encounter,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion5059 1.shtml.
238. Id. § 5.046(1)-(2)--Filming Patients for the Education of Health Professionals,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion5046.shtml.
239. Id. § 5.045(2)-Filming Patients in Health Care Settings, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion5045.shtml.
240. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-501
to -553 (West Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.02.005 to -.904 (West 2002 & Supp.
2009); WIs. STAT. § 146.83 (West Supp. 2009).
241. 45 C.F.R. § 164.500-534 (2009).
242. HIPPA Basics: Medical Privacy in the Electronic Age, http://www.privacyrights.org/
fs/fs8a-hipaa.htm.
243. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, What's Wrong With Health Privacy?, 5 J. HEALTH & BIo.
L. 1-32 (2009).
244. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-534 (2009).
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institutions.245 Additionally, there have been strong critiques of the Office of
Civil Rights in its approach to enforcing the regulations.246 Some of the
complaints about HIPAA's limitations should be addressed as a result of the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act,
(HITECH), Subtitle D,247 (part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009248). For example, "Business Associates" are no longer indirectly
regulated through terms in their contracts with "Covered Entities" but are directly
subject to the HIPAA code, 249 including its penalties.2 10 HITECH seeks to
respond to criticisms about HIPAA's lack of an educative goal, requiring
regulations on educating health providers 251 and an initiative to "enhance public
transparency regarding the uses of protected health information., 25 2  The
legislation requires new regulations to strengthen the proportionality ("minimum
necessary" under HIPAA) of disclosures 253 and strengthened restrictions on the
use of protected health information for marketing purposes. 254 Enforcement
should improve because of both tighter definitions of breaches of the code255 and
additional enforcement through state attorneys general 6.25  Although there is still
no private right of action, there will be a system designed to distribute a
percentage of civil penalties or settlements collected from providers to injured
patients.257
Notwithstanding the HIPAA approach to preemption, the HIPAA "floor,"
continues.2" Further, the exact changes to the confidentiality code will depend
on regulations made pursuant to the enabling legislation included in HITECH.
Although the HIPAA code and this forthcoming "version 2.0" are relevant
245. See, e.g., id. §§ 164.508, 164.510, 164.512.
246. See, e.g., Kirk J. Nahra, The HIPAA Enforcement Era Begins!, WILEY REIN LLP, Aug.
2008, availableathttp://www.wileyrein.com/publication-newsletters.cfin?id= 10&publication id=
13717; Anne Zieger, Why Toughen HIPAA When Nobody Enforces It?, FIERCE HEALTHIT, Jan. 25,
2009, available athttp://www.flercehealthit.com/story/why-toughen-hipaa-when-nobody-enforces-
it/2009-01-25.
247. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§§ 13001-13424, 123 Stat. 226.
248. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5-8 U.S.C., 10 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15-16
U.S.C., 18-20 U.S.C., 25-26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 32 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C., 40-42 U.S.C., 45-
47 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C.).
249. Id. § 13401(a)-(b).
250. Id. § 13404(c).
251. Id. § 13403(a).
252. Id. § 13403(b).
253. Id. § 13405(b).
254. Id. § 13406(a).
255. Id. § 13409-10.
256. Id. § 13410(e).
257. Id. § 13410(c).
258. Id. § 13421.
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to the regulation of the social network fact patterns discussed in this article, they
are of less importance than in traditional, offline healthcare "boundary"
scenarios. Running a Twitter feed from inside a hospital or physician blog posts
that identify patients would seem to implicate HIPAA's "covered entity"
requirements as far as confidentiality and consent. However, HIPAA still only
applies to data entrusted to and subsequently disclosed by healthcare providers.
Thus, patient health information that is posted to a social network site by
someone other than a covered entity (e.g., by the patient) will not trigger HIPAA.
Perhaps the most important limitation of HIPAA relevant to this Article is that
the federal code does not create boundaries as to the collection of patient
information (e.g., by insurers, employers or even physicians surfing patient
profiles), but only its disclosure. As a result, most of the "boundary" analysis
that follows will rotate around common law theories of liability.
III. SETTING BOUNDARIES FOR PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS
Patients and their healthcare providers are robust users of global and
enterprise wide networks. However, the two groups seldom intentionally interact
using such tools,259 notwithstanding governmental and healthcare institutions
interest in promoting online interactions such as researching efficient healthcare
interventions or sharing electronic medical records.26 More than 61% of U.S.
adults search for health information online.26' Sustained growth in patient
enthusiasm for online interactions notwithstanding,262 many physicians still view
direct contact with patients via email as time-consuming tasks best left to staff263
259. See Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontijres (or How I Stopped Worrying About
Viagra on the Web but Grew Concerned About the Future of Healthcare Delivery), 4 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 183, 186 (2004) [hereinafter Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontires]
(describing impact Internet has on doctor-patient relationship). But see Jaymes Song, In Hawaii,
the Doctor Is Always in-Online, NEWSVINE, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.newsvine.com/_
news/2009/01/15/2313309-in-hawaii-the-doctor-is-always-in-online (describing exceptions to the
dearth of online physician-patient interactions).
260. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs and Risks
to Consumers?, 1 DREXEL L. REv. 216 (2009) (discussing growth of commercial personal health
records models); Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality
of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 681, 691-96 (discussing drivers behind move
to electronic records); see also Nicolas P. Terry, To HIPAA, A Son: Assessing The Technical,
Conceptual, and Legal Frameworks for Patient Safety Information, 12 WIDENER L. REv. 133
(2005).
261. Fox & Jones, supra note 63, at 2.
262. Paul Rosen & C. Kent Kwoh, Patient-Physician E-mail: An Opportunity to Transform
Pediatric Health Care Delivery, 120 PEDIATRICS 701 (2007); Hardeep Singh et al., Older Patients'
Enthusiasm to Use Electronic Mail to Communicate With Their Physicians: Cross-Sectional
Survey, 11 J. MED. INTERNET REs. e. 18 (2009), http://www.jmir.org/2009/2/el 8.
263. Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontidres, supra note 259, at 227.
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or creating unacceptable time pressures during consultations. 2' The AMA
remains concerned that email contact will damage the traditional framework of
the physician-patient relationship. 65 Meanwhile regulators and prosecutors take
the position that online practice encourages opportunistic online relationships
designed to encourage the illegal distribution of prescription drugs.
266
To this dystopian online world of physicians and patients now must be added
category-blurring behavior by both cohorts: physicians intending to blog or
tweet to other physicians but reaching a far broader audience; patients exposing
medical or genetic signals in apparently private Facebook posts; physicians
disclosing sufficient personal information on their profile pages to concern a
patient or raise a red flag during a pre-employment background check; and
physicians entering perhaps unintended relationships with a small number of the
undifferentiated cohorts they meet online.
This section seeks to identify some of the "pinch points" that could lead to
legal exposure for healthcare providers or an array of surprises for patients.
A. Physicians' Social Information Online
Search is omnipresent as both a personal and professional tool. We can
Google our friends or colleagues and increasingly may view it as unprofessional
to take a meeting with someone un-researched.
In fact, 35% of adults have used the Internet to search "for information about
physicians or other health professionals." '67 A slightly smaller group (28%)
searches for information about institutional providers.268  There is a robust
correlation between the adults that search for information online and those who
use social network sites; some 39% of the former cohort use social network
sites.269 Emerging consumer-driven healthcare models suggest that patients
should research their potential providers.
There are innumerable, searchable databases regarding regulatory
proceedings or litigation with adverse results for physicians. These include The
National Practitioner Data Bank,270 the Federation Physician Data Center, 27 and
264. Henry W.W. Potts & Jeremy C. Wyatt, Survey of Doctors'Experience of Patients Using
the Internet, 4 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e5 (2002), http://www.jmir.org/2002/1/e5. See also Pauline
W. Chen, Medicine in the Age of Twitter, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/11 /health/1 lchen.html?_ r-2; The Efficient MD-Life Hacks for Healthcare,
http://efficientmd.blogspot.com/2008/04/ten-trends-in-american-medicine.htm (Apr. 24, 2008,
12:22) (noting that the tenth top trend in healthcare is that Information Technology Will Fall Short
of Promises).
265. AMA, CODE OFMEDICALETHICS § 5.026-The Use of Electronic Mail, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion5026.shtml.
266. See Terry, Prescriptions sans Fronti res, supra note 259, at 199-202.
267. Fox & Jones, supra note 63, at 35.
268. Id. at 46.
269. Id. at 15.
270. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 401-32, 100 Stat.
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resources maintained by state medical boards.272 But these databases are not
always complete (although the reach of the NPDB may be expanding273) and
seldom will document social behavior.
In 2008, Thompson and colleagues evaluated the Facebook profiles of
University of Florida medical students and residents; 44.5% of medical students
had a Facebook account, but only 37.5% of profiles were made private.2 74 The
study found that, "[u]se is more common among students, and most chose to keep
their profiles open to the public. 2 7' The study found that many of these accounts
included personal information "that is not usually disclosed in a doctor-patient
relationship." '276 A random sub-sample of such studied sites disclosed; "content
that could be interpreted negatively," such as excess alcohol consumption and
foul language.277
As discussed below employers routinely search the social network sites of
applicants and employees even though this practice is not without legal risk.278
Such disincentives notwithstanding, in the wake of high-profile hiring scandals
the case can be made that no hospital or system should make a professional
appointment without first performing a detailed background check using all
available search tools; including searches of social network sites. Recall, for
example, the data available about some of the Florida medical students.279
Further, a social network profile might contain postings, uploaded and tagged
data, or membership in online groups that could signal anything from substance
abuse to attitudes about race or gender.
In the healthcare domain this background-checking issue is of increasing
importance because of the rise of so-called 'negligent credentialing' suits brought
by a patient against a health care facility allegedly injured as a result of the acts
or omissions of a facility-credentialed physician. In Larson v. Wasemiller,28° the
Minnesota Supreme Court noted:
Given our previous recognition of a hospital's duty of care to protect its
3743. See generally http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/.
271. FSMB, http://www.fsmb.org/m fpdc.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
272. See, e.g., Virginia Board of Medicine Practitioner Information, http://www.
vahealthprovider.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
273. HHS NPRM, National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and
Other Health Care Practitioners: Reporting on Adverse and Negative Actions, 71 Fed. Reg. 14139-
49 (Mar. 21, 2006).
274. Lindsay A. Thompson et al., The Intersection of Online Social Networking with Medical
Professionalism, 23 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 954, 954 (2008).
275. Id. at 956.
276. Id.; see also Jeff Cain, Online Social Networking Issues Within Academia andPharmacy
Education, 72 AM. J. PHARM. EDUC. 10 (2008).
277. Thompson et al., supra note 274, at 955-56.
278. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
280. 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007).
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patients from harm by third persons and of the analogous tort of
negligent hiring, and given the general acceptance in the common law of
the tort of negligent selection of an independent contractor, as
recognized by the Restatement of Torts, we conclude that the tort of
negligent credentialing is inherent in and the natural extension of well-
established common law rights.
281
The Larson court's 2007 opinion identified twenty-seven states that have
recognized some form of the cause of action,282 notwithstanding the difficult
causation issues such suits pose.283
Although Larson recognized an action by the patient against the credentialing
hospital, an important, additional legal implication was discussed in Kadlec
Medical Center v. Lakeview Anesthesia Associates.2' A patient in the plaintiffs
medical center emerged from routine tubal ligation surgery in a permanent
vegetative state.285 The medical center settled a claim based on its respondeat
superior for the alleged negligence of a drug-addicted anesthesiologist. 286 The
medical center and its malpractice carrier then filed suit against the medical
group where the anesthesiologist had previously practiced and the hospital where
he worked and whose employees had discovered his drug abuse.2 87 The group
had terminated the anesthesiologist for drug abuse but had not reported him to
the state medical board or NPDB. 288 Sixty-eight days after that termination
members of the anesthesiology group submitted referral letters to a locum service
that praised and recommended the physician yet failed to mention his drug abuse
or that he had been terminated with a letter that included the phrase "[y]our
impaired condition ... puts our patients at significant risk., 289 The plaintiff
medical center's detailed credentialing request to the hospital where the
anesthesiologist had previously been credentialed was replied to with a brief and
neutral statement of the dates of his prior employment. 29" At trial, the jury found
for the plaintiff medical center on claims of intentional and negligent
misrepresentation, and awarded $8.24 million (the settlement and attorney's fees
in the original case).29'
281. Id. at306.
282. Id. at 306-07; see also Harrison v. Binnion, 214 P.3d 631, 635 (Idaho 2009) (holding
peer review immunity statute does not create immunity for negligent credentialing); Frigo v. Silver
Cross Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
283. See, e.g., Davis v. St. Francis Hosp., No. 00C-06-045-JRJ, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 272,
at *9-10 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2002).
284. 527 F.3d 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 631 (2008).
285. Id. at 417.
286. Id.
287. Id. at417-18.
288. Id. at 416.




On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed the verdict against the hospital on the
basis that under Louisiana law these facts did not give rise to an affirmative duty
to disclose; 292 a decision that may have been somewhat generous to the hospital
and that may not be replicated in other jurisdictions. However, the court did
affirm the judgment against the medical reference letter writers for affirmative
misrepresentation, noting that "[t]hese letters are false on their face and
materially misleading.
293
Healthcare institutions making credentialing or hiring decisions currently
face a dilemma when it comes to information about physicians contained in
social network profiles. Although there may be some risks in searching against
them (as discussed in the next section), the potential liability for making a
personnel decision in the absence of such information likely tips the balance.
B. Patients'Health-Related Information Online
Health-related information posted online by patients might include open
references to medical conditions or risk-taking (e.g., photographs of alcohol or
drug abuse) or quite explicit signals of risky behaviors (e.g., membership of the
Facebook page "I do really stupid stuff when I'm Drunk"2 94). Other signals may
be more nuanced (e.g., membership of the Facebook fan page "A Glass of Wine
Solves Everything"2 95). Equally, membership in some social groups related to
health conditions, although a relatively small number of persons join such
groups, 296 may operate as implicit signals regarding personal or family health
(e.g., membership of Facebook group pages relating to Cancer Survivors,
297
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome,298 or Autism Awareness 299). Social network
discussions by sufferers and survivors are frequently cited as an emergent area
of powerful patient self-help.3"' But all such information may be of interest to
292. Id. at 422 ("The defendants did not have a fiduciary or contractual duty to disclose what
it knew to [plaintiff]. And although the defendants might have had an ethical obligation to disclose
their knowledge of [the anesthesiologist's] drug problems, they were also rightly concerned about
a possible defamation claim if they communicated negative information about [him].").
293. Id. at419.
294. I Do Really Stupid Stuff When I'm Drunk, http://www.facebook.com/group.
php?gid=222270916 (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
295. A Glass of Wine Solves Everything, http://www.facebook.com/home.php#/group.
php?gid=2390228727 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
296. Fox, & Jones, supra note 63, at 17 (Only 6% of the cohort that looks for health
information online "have started or joined a health-related group on a social networking site.").
297. Cancer Survivors, http://www.facebook.com/home.php#/group.php?gid=2214852731
(last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
298. Chronic Fatigue Syndrome or Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, http://www.facebook.com/
group.php?gid=65675018622 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
299. Autism Awareness, http://www.facebook.com/home.php#/group.php?gid=22079423 10
(last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
300. See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb, Seeking a Cure, Patients Find a Dose of Conversation
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employers or health insurers, and hopefully with more beneficence, physicians
who search against their profiles.
1. Employers and Insurers.-Published surveys in the general employment
world suggest that somewhere from one-quarter 3°0 to one-half of employers
search the social network sites of potential employees.0 2 Surveyed employers
took particular note of suggestions of alcohol or drug use, inappropriate photos
or other posted information, and "unprofessional" screen names.30 3 Of course,
sometimes, employee misconduct hardly needs any searching. The viral nature
of data posted on social network sites is immense. But a video made by two
pizza chain employees violating various health codes attracted one million views
on YouTube and resulted in felony charges for the employees.
Employer scrutiny of social network profiles implicates some legal risk when
information discovered therein migrates into employment decisions.305  For
example, under federal law there is the potential for a discrimination action if a
candidate was not hired because of religious belief or a disability revealed or
suggested on a social network site. 6 Some state laws prohibit a broader list of
discriminations (e.g., sexual orientation in California30 7). Going further, some
state laws apply privacy and non-discrimination principles to private activities
by employees.308
Online, WASH. POST, July 21, 2008, at DOI.
301. Heather Havenstein, One in Five Employers Uses Social Networks in Hiring Process,
COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 12,2008, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9114560/one-in-five_
employers uses socialnetworks in hiring_process (22%); see also Wei Du, Job Candidates
Getting Tripped Up by Facebook, Aug. 14, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20202935/;
Melissa Newton, Employers Use MySpace, Facebook to Screen Applicants, NBC DFW, Nov. 19,
2008, http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/business/Employers-Use-MySpace-Facebook-to-Screen-
Applicants.html.
302. Adam Lisberg, Employers May Be Searching Applicants' Facebook Profiles, Experts
Warn, DAILY NEWS (New York City), Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2008/
03/10/2008-03-1 Oemployersmaybesearching_applicantsfa.html (noting that 44% of
employers searched profiles ofjob candidates on social networking sites; 39% searched a current
employee's Facebook or MySpace pages).
303. Havenstein, supra note 301.
304. Stephanie Clifford, Video Prank at Domino's Taints Brand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/business/media/l 6dominos.html.
305. See generally Tarn D. Williams & Abigail Lounsbury Morrow, Want to Know Your
Employees Better? Log on to a Social Network: But, Be Warned, You May Not Like What You See,
69 ALA. LAW. 131, 132 (2008) (describing an employer's exposure to liability through use of social
networking sites).
306. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 (2006).
307. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006).
308. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-
402.5(1) (West 2008) ("It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an employer
to terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee's engaging in any lawful
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
Information posted in the pseudo-secluded world of a social network site
could signal certain genetic information." 9 This issue is clearly on the radar of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as evidenced by a
recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) issued under the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA).1
GINA, signed into law in May 2008, broadly prohibits discrimination by
employers and health insurers based upon genetic information. One of GINA's
key provisions is to characterize an "employer, ' 31 1 "employment agency,
' 3, 2
"labor organization," 313  or "labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining ' 31 4 that "request[s], require[s], or
purchase[s] genetic information with respect to an employee or a family member
of the employee" as having engaged in an "unlawful employment practice. 31 5
GINA offers several safe harbors including "where an employer purchases
documents that are commercially and publicly available (including newspapers,
magazines, periodicals, and books, but not including medical databases or court
records) that include family medical history."3 6 In the EEOC's 2009 NPRM
under GINA this exception is expanded to include "electronic media, such as
information communicated through television, movies, or the Internet, except that
a covered entity may not research medical databases or court records, even where
such databases may be publicly and commercially available, for the purpose of
obtaining genetic information about an individual."31 7 In its commentary, EEOC
invited "public comment on whether there are sources similar in kind to those
identified in the statute that may contain family medical history and should be
included either in the group of excepted sources or the group of prohibited
sources, such as personal Web sites, or social networking sites."3 8 An EEOC
decision to take the latter approach and to wall-off genetically-related social
network data from employer or insurer use would signal the first use of an
inalienability rule in the social network regulatory space.
activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours .....
309. For example, membership on a certain Facebook page might signal about family concerns
regarding Type I diabetes (juvenile diabetes). See Find a Cure for Juvenile Diabetes,
facebook.com/group.php?gid=2204811909 (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
310. Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, Regulations Under the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 9056-01 (Mar. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1635); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881.
311. Id. § 202(b).
312. Id. § 203(b).
313. Id. § 204(b).
314. Id. § 205(a).
315. Id. §§ 205(a), 205(b).
316. Id. §§ 202(b)(4), 203(b)(4), 204(b)(4), 205(b)(4).
317. Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, Regulations Under the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 9056-01 (Mar. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1635).
318. Id. at 9063.
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In the meantime employers and insurers likely will argue that the law of
boundaries has little relevance to their activities. First, the intrusion tort would
not apply to a non-corporeal (or informational) seclusion. Second, any publicity
action should fail because the information searched is not "private" as it has been
disclosed to the social network user's "friends," although the use of the
discovered information does not satisfy the "publicity" requirement; the
broadcast "public" channel property is inapplicable and because the information
is only used "internally," plaintiff cannot meet the numerical touchstone required
for "private" channel cases.
The decisional law suggests some validity regarding the second of these
publicity arguments, at least in most cases of minimal distribution.
Notwithstanding and as argued below, the information should be viewed as
"private" when the user has applied privacy and security settings.
However, employers and insurers should be less sanguine about the
inapplicability of the seclusion tort. Case law already recognizes areas of
seclusion in otherwise public areas;319 the question that is open is whether an
application of security and privacy settings will be the touchstone for delineating
a secluded space. The non-corporeal argument is more difficult. To an extent
the courts will face a core entitlement question; whether to consign to history the
trespass-like roots of the intrusion tort and apply it more liberally to
informational privacy. If they take this latter, less existential, approach the
appropriate doctrinal solution will be to pivot the tort around the offensiveness
of the intrusion rather than the locus of the seclusion.32
2. Physician Use of Posted Social Information.-Employers and health
insurers may have understandable business reasons for searching online profiles.
But should physicians research their patients? And what should be done with
such information diagnostically?
Of course, not all patient-posted information allows for identification of
specific patients. As such, aggregated discussions by de-identified patients
provides an educational opportunity for physicians who wish to learn more about
generalized care models and patient perceptions and experiences associated with
particular illnesses or diseases.32'
However, Moreno and colleagues examined the profile pages of self-
described sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds in the "class of 2008" MySpace
group, and found that most were identifiable by name, photograph, location and
that "[n]early half of the adolescents .. .publicly disclosed sexual activity,
alcohol use, tobacco use, or drug use." '322 A similar study of sixteen- to eighteen-
year-olds across several social network sites by Williams and colleagues found
319. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
321. Salil A. Mehta, What Can Physicians Learn from the Blogs of Patients with Uveitis?, 15
OCULAR IMMUNOLOGY AT INFLAMMATION 421, 423 (2007).
322. Megan A. Moreno et al., What Are Adolescents Showing the WorldAbout Their Health
Risk Behaviors on MySpace?, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. (2007), available at http://medscape.com/
viewarticle/563320.
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"84% of profiles and blog discussions containing some type of risk-taking
behaviors," with nearly 50% of the participants at some risk of specific
identification.
323
The availability of this type of patient-specific information creates a classic
emerging technology problem for physicians. May they ethically and legally
access such information and, if they do, will they create a standard of care
requiring scrutiny of such online data? The first question is easier to answer;
general ethical standards suggest that physicians ask their patients' permission
to access such information, even if it is publicly available. This stance dovetails
with good risk management in that obtaining not just consent but informed
consent regarding the access and use of such data will reduce the likelihood of
either intrusion or malpractice actions. The second question, going to the
standard of care, is more difficult to answer. At the very least professional
specialty organizations (e.g., the American Psychiatric Association) should
consider developing clinical practice guidelines on the subject with a view to
preempting the indeterminacy of case-by-case development of the standard of
care.
3. Third Parties Posting Patient Information.-Physicians will seldom be
the direct source for patient-related health information that finds its way onto a
social network site. Patients themselves, or their "friends" will have posted most
such data. Some information may be sourced from providers (itself potentially
implicating breach of confidence or HIPAA) but posted by meddlesome third
parties.324 Here, publicity and breach of confidence actions still may be
applicable. The controversies in the recent Minnesota case of Yath v. Fairview
Clinics,325 began with a patient visit to a hospital clinic for STD testing. An
acquaintance related to the patient's husband worked at the clinic as a medical
assistant.326 She recognized the patient and subsequently accessed her electronic
medical record.327 There she discovered that the patient tested positive for a STD
and the fact that the patient had a new sexual partner.3 28 The medical assistant
passed on the information to another employee and the information eventually
323. Amanda L. Williams & Michael J. Merten, A Review of Online Social Networking
Profiles by Adolescents: Implications for Future Research and Intervention, 43 ADOLESCENCE
253, 264 (2008).
324. See, e.g., Meade v. Orthopedic Assocs. of Windham County, No. CV064005043, 2007
Conn. LEXIS 3424, at *7 (Conn. Super. Dec. 27,2007), 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3424 (holding
when employee acquired and distributed patient records but action was only filed against health
facility that "[a] cause of action for invasion of privacy will not lie where the defendant did not
directly publicize the private facts about the plaintiff even though 'publicity was a natural and
foreseeable consequence' ofthe defendant's actions"). Ofcourse the institution may be responsible
vicariously in some circumstances and might still face HIPAA liability.
325. 767 N.W.2d 34, 58 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
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became known to the patient's estranged husband.329 After an investigation the
medical assistant was terminated by the hospital.33° Shortly thereafter a MySpace
page was created containing information from the patient's medical record.33'
The page was online for approximately twenty-four hours and likely was viewed
by only six people.332 The patient brought action against most of the actors and
the hospital on several theories including public disclosure of private facts and
the private right of action provided by Minnesota's Health Records Act.333 The
trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment.334
On appeal the court remanded the issue of the statutory private right of action
asserted by the patient against the hospital and the medical assistant to the trial
court, but not before ruling that such a state private right of action was not
preempted by the federal HIPAA code. 35 Instead, ruling that the provisions were
complementary: "[r]ather than creating an 'obstacle' to HIPAA, Minnesota
statutes section 144.335 supports at least one of HIPAA's goals by establishing
another disincentive to wrongfully disclose a patient's health care record., 336 A
similar analysis should apply to a common law action for breach of confidence
by a healthcare provider.
The Yath court affirmed the summary judgment on the public disclosure
count on the basis that the likely authors of the MySpace page had been
dismissed from the action.337 Notwithstanding, the court exhaustively examined
the defendant's other contention that the "publicity" requirement 3 8 was not
satisfied by posting to a social network site that was only available for a short
time and viewed by a small number of people. 339 The court referenced a
controlling Minnesota analysis of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section
652D3 40 establishing the "publicity" element was satisfied by proving either, "a
single communication to the public," or "communication to individuals in such
a large number that the information is deemed to have been communicated to the
public.""34 The court viewed posting to a social network site as an example of
the former type of public communication because "[t]his Internet communication
is materially similar in nature to a newspaper publication or a radio broadcast
329. Id.
330. Id. at 39.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 39, 43.
333. Id. at 39. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.335 (West 2005) governed the case but has been
replaced by MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 144.298 (West Supp. 2010).
334. Yath, 767 N.W.2d at 40.
335. Id. at 50.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 45.
338. See supra text accompanying note 178.
339. Yath, 767 N.W.2d at 42-45.
340. Id. at 42.
341. Id.
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because upon release it is available to the public at large. 342 Analogizing this
brief web posting to "a late-night radio broadcast aired for a few seconds and
potentially heard by a few hundred (or by no one), 34 3 or "a poster displayed in
a shop window,"' 3" the court noted:
It is true that mass communication is no longer limited to a tiny handful
of commercial purveyors and that we live with much greater access to
information than the era in which the tort of invasion of privacy
developed. A town crier could reach dozens, a handbill hundreds, a
newspaper or radio station tens of thousands, a television station
millions, and now a publicly accessible webpage can present the story
of someone's private life, in this case complete with a photograph and
other identifying features, to more than one billion Internet surfers
worldwide. This extraordinary advancement in communication argues
for, not against, a holding that the MySpace posting constitutes
publicity.345
The Yath court specifically noted that the MySpace profile in question was not
one to which access had been restricted by "a password or some other restrictive
safeguard." '346 Thus, it left hanging the same question as the one in Moreno v.
Hanford Sentinel, Inc.,"' where, as previously discussed, a college student's
MySpace posting, critical of her hometown, found its way to the local
newspaper.348 If a social network site user applies security and privacy settings,
would that render the site "secluded" for the purpose of initiating a breach of
seclusion action or "private" for the purpose of resisting a publicity claim?
The most efficient approach for courts to adopt would be a bright line
"posting" rule; that is, all posts, security or privacy settings notwithstanding, are
public. Such an approach would avoid the inevitable and possibly interminable
case-by-case debates whether "private" exposure of information to 10,100, or
even 1000 friends would be akin to a public post.
However, that approach seems contrary to Hill v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass 'n,349 otherwise followed in Moreno. Hill upheld the NCAA's drug
testing program in a suit brought by student athletes arguing violation of
California's constitutional right to privacy. Subsequently, it may be have been
narrowed by the Supreme Court of California in Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers,
Ltd. 3 a case dealing with security pat-downs at a football stadium. Sheehan re-
342. Id. at 43.
343. Id. at 44.
344. Id. at 45.
345. Id. at 44.
346. Id.
347. 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858 (Ct. App. 2009).
348. See supra text accompanying note 147.
349. 865 P.2d 633 (1994).
350. Id. at 669.
351. 201 P.3d 472 (Cal. 2009).
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emphasized Hill's statement about context: "assessment of the relative strength
and importance of privacy norms and countervailing interests may differ in cases
of private, as opposed to government, action. 352 Sheehan also stressed Hill's
observation that a plaintiff's privacy interests when bringing an action under
California's constitutional privacy right "may weigh less in the balance" '353 if he
or she "was able to choose freely among competing public or private entities in
obtaining access to some opportunity, commodity, or service." '354
Yet, in the context of the common law of boundaries, Hill's words remain
potent:
Privacy rights also have psychological foundations emanating from
personal needs to establish and maintain identity and self-esteem by
controlling self-disclosure: "In a society in which multiple, often
conflicting role performances are demanded of each individual, the
original etymological meaning of the word 'person'-mask-has taken
on new meaning. [People] fear exposure not only to those closest to
them; much of the outrage underlying the asserted right to privacy is a
reaction to exposure to persons known only through business or other
secondary relationships. The claim is not so much one of total secrecy
as it is of the right to define one's circle of intimacy-to choose who
shall see beneath the quotidian mask. Loss of control over which 'face'
one puts on may result in literal loss of self-identity, and is humiliating
beneath the gaze of those whose curiosity treats a human being as an
object." '355
The key privacy expectation acknowledged by the law of boundaries is this
"right to define one's circle of intimacy." '356 As citizens spend more of their time
in online environments and make responsible use of privacy and security settings
to disaggregate those with whom they interact, so the law should respect their
defined circles of intimacy.
C. Physicians and Patients as "Friends"
Suppose a physician "friends" a patient or vice versa. Does such blurring of
personal and professional relationships create concern in either the legal or
ethical domains? In the case of the former the primary question will be whether
such a blurred, technologically mediated relationship could give rise to the
legally significant physician-patient relationship. 7 In the ethical domain, the
352. Id. at 479 (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d at 656).
353. Id. (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d at 657).
354. Id.
355. 865 P.2d at 647 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971).
356. See id.
357. A related question is whether physician-patient contact through a social network could
constitute the continuation of a relationship for the purposes of tolling a period of limitation. See,
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question will come down to motive: is there a sense that the relationship is
driven by the needs of the physician rather than the interests of the patient?
Again, context is important in unpacking the boundary issues. The
appropriate question must be whether social or professional interests motivate the
physician who follows a patient on Facebook or Twitter. If the motivation is
social, then difficult boundary issues may arise. Ifprofessional (e.g., using social
media to extend the treatment space), difficult risk management questions arise.
1. Creating a Physician-Patient Relationship.-Most of the scenarios
discussed in this article assume the existence of a physician-patient relationship
and then discuss how physician or patient online activities will play out against
the healthcare regulatory matrix. Discussed, therefore, are scenarios such as
physicians searching their patients' social network sites or micro-blogging about
their treatment. Suppose, however, that there is no formed professional
relationship at the point when a patient and a physician interact online. Could
such interaction trigger the creation of a physician-patient relationship?
Such a relationship is both a conclusion and a term of art relied upon by the
ethical and legal domains. As an ethical construct, it is the foundation of duties
(and correlate expectations) of competence, respect, and confidence.358 In the
legal domain, the existence of a physician-patient relationship establishes the
contractual responsibilities of the parties (such as the provision of services and
the obligation to pay) and is the predicate for the finding of a legal duty; a
requirement for tort recovery in the case of negligently provided care.359
These domain-specific questions engender the question: what does it take
to create the physician-patient relationship? The doctrinal answer is that "the
relationship is created when professional services are rendered and accepted for
purposes of medical treatment. '3 60  The existence of a physician-patient
relationship is usually a question of fact left to the jury.36" ' In practice, therefore,
the key issue is where the courts draw the summary judgment line.
e.g., Weaver ex rel. Weaver v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 506 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993); Griffith v. Brant, 442 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). See generally Jewson
v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 408-09 (8th Cir. 1982) (discussing what constitutes evidence of a
continuing physician-patient relationship for the purposes of determining the statute of limitations
period for medical malpractice actions).
358. See, e.g., AMA, Principles ofMedicalEthics (2001), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.shtm.
359. See, e.g., Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440,445 (Md. 2002); Kruger ex rel.
Estate of Kruger v. Jennings, No. 227480,2002 WL 344268, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2002),
superseded by 2002 WL 652098; Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tenn. 1994).
360. Miller v. Sullivan, 214 A.2d 822, 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
361. See, e.g., Irvin ex rel. Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d934,940-41 (Kan. 2001); Lyons v. Grether,
239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977); Walker v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 434 S.E.2d 63, 69 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993); Cogswell ex rel. Cogswell v. Chapman, 249 A.D.2d 865,866 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Bienz
v. Cent. Suffolk Hosp., 163 A.D.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) ("Whether the physician's
giving of advice furnishes a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that an implied physician-
patient relationship had arisen is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.").
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Because of the consensual nature of the physician-patient relationship, courts
must determine in these cases whether the physician consented to treat the
patient.362 Such consent can be express, implied,363 or derived from a duty owed
by the physician to another.36 In short, "whatever circumstances evince the
physician's consent to act for the patient's medical benefit., 365 This approach
explains most of the decisions related to the clusters of fact-patterns that are
relatively mature. For example, how courts navigate the distinction between the
informal (or "curbside") consult 366 and the formal (or "bedside") consult,36 7 deal
with the responsibilities of on-call but non-treating physicians, 368 and respond to
cases where patients are examined by physicians employed by others such as
employers or insurers.369
362. "The physician may consent to the relationship by explicitly contracting with the patient,
treating hospital, or treating physician. Or the physician may take certain actions that indicate
knowing consent, such as examining, diagnosing, treating, orprescribing treatment for the patient."
Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Ohio 2002).
363. See, e.g., St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420,423 (Tex. 1995) (stating that a doctor-patient
relationship can only be formed with the express or implied consent of physician).
364. See Bovara v. St. Francis Hosp., 700 N.E.2d 143, 146 (111. App. Ct. 1998) ("A consensual
relationship can be found to exist.., where a physician accepts a referral of a patient [from another
physician]." (citations omitted)).
365. Lownsbury, 762 N.E.2d at 360.
366. See, e.g., Irvin, 31 P.3d at 943 (holding that an "extension of the physician-patient
relationship to include... [curbside] consultation would be contrary to public policy"); Oja v. Kin,
581 N.W.2d 739,743 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that "merely listening to another physician's
description of a patient's problem and offering a professional opinion regarding the proper course
of treatment is not enough [to form a patient-physician relationship]"); Corbet v. McKinney, 980
S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing factors where a consulting physician may develop a
patient-physician relationship with a patient whom the consulting physician has never met or
spoken with). Cf Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (determining if a
patient-physician relationship exists between a patient and a consulting physician depends on
whether the treating physician used independent judgment when accepting or rejecting advice of
consulting physician); Cogswell, 249 A.D.2d at 866 (holding that a telephone call can create a
patient-physician relationship if physician "affirmatively advises a prospective patient as to a course
of treatment and it is foreseeable that the patient would rely on the advice" (quotations omitted)).
367. See, e.g., Kelley v. Middle Tenn. Emergency Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 595
(Tenn. 2004) (distinguishing on call physicians from those participating in informal physician to
physician consults).
368. See, e.g., Prosise v. Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331, 334 (Va. 2001) (holding that there was no
patient-physician relationship because there was no evidence that physician agreed to take patient's
case by agreeing to act as an on-call attending physician in a teaching hospital); Wazevich v. Tasse,
No. 88938, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4484, at *17 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2007) (finding that an
on-call doctor and emergency room patient may develop a patient-physician relationship depending
on the hospital's procedures and whether physician took affirmative action on behalf of the patient).
369. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530, 538 (Colo. 1993) (holding that an
independent medical examiner had a duty of care to not cause examinee harm); Dyer v. Trachtman,
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The cases dealing with technologically mediated, but not physical contact
between physician and patient, are less transparent. It does seem clear that "a
telephone call merely to schedule an appointment with a provider of medical
services does not by itself establish a physician-patient relationship where the
caller has no ongoing physician-patient relationship with the provider and does
not seek or obtain medical advice during the conversation., 37 ° Similarly, merely
scheduling a diagnostic test is likely insufficient.37" ' As soon as there is
engagement in the treatment process by the physician; however, the relationship
may be held to exist."'
The case that is closest to a social network scenario is Miller v. Sullivan,373
where a dentist telephoned a friend who was a physician between 9:30 a.m. to
10:00 a.m., and informed him that he believed he was having a heart attack.3 74
The physician allegedly told the dentist "to come over and see him right
away. 3 75 The dentist continued to see his own patients through the morning,
however, and did not reach the physician's office until the early afternoon at
which point he suffered a cardiac arrest.376 The court upheld the defendant
physician's summary judgment377 by finding the physician owed the decedent no
duty of care and therefore there was no breach of duty:
Assuming that a physician renders professional service for purposes of
medical treatment to a prospective patient who calls on the telephone
when the physician tells the caller to come to his office right away, the
record in this case conclusively establishes that decedent did not accept
679 N.W.2d 311,314 (Mich. 2004) (holding that "an [independent medical examination] physician
has a limited physician-patient relationship with the examinee... [with] limited duties to exercise
professional care"); Harris v. Kreutzer, 624 S.E.2d 24, 32 (Va. 2006) (holding that "physician's
duty is limited solely to the exercise of due care... as not to cause harm to the patient in actual
conduct ofthe examination"); Hellerv. Peekskill Cmty. Hosp., 198 A.D.2d 265,265-66 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (citing factors plaintiff must prove to establish that an examining doctor consented to
a patient-physician relationship).
370. Weaver ex rel. Weaver v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 506 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich.
App. Ct. 1993).
371. Jackson v. Isaac, 76 S.W.3d 177, 184 (Tex. App. 2002).
372. Bienz v. Cent. Suffolk Hosp., 163 A.D.2d 269,269,270 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding
that a telephone conversation that includes recommendation for a course of treatment may give rise
to physician-patient relationship); Lam v. Global Med. Sys., Inc., Ill P.3d 1258, 1261 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding that ship-to-shore radio communication was sufficient to create physician-
patient relationship under the facts of the case); see also Cogswell ex rel. Cogswell v. Chapman,
249 A.D.2d 865, 866-67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that telephone consult may establish a
physician-patient relationship depending on physician's level of participation in patient's care).
373. 214 A.D.2d 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
374. Id. at 822.
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the professional service. Instead, decedent chose to pursue an entirely
different course of conduct than that recommended by defendant.378
In conflating the issues of duty and breach, the Miller court made it less than
clear whether a physician-patient relationship existed on these facts. Arguably,
the court held that there was no such relationship because (and this is a different
approach from the cases discussed above) the patient failed to agree to the
relationship by rejecting the physician's advice.379
Physicians seem to understand the perils of creating an unexpected, offline
physician-patient relationship. They show caution in social interactions (e.g., at
social gatherings, parties, etc.). This caution will need to be extended to online
interactions.
In the absence of a pre-existing physician-patient relationship the blog
scenario gives rise to issues that are similar to those encountered by physicians
in navigating email questions about health; more specifically, responding to
unsolicited email.380 When a non-patient poses a health-related question to a
physician, be it through an email, a blog, or a social network site, the physician
has two core options; to ignore the question or to answer it. Ignoring such a
communication is not without some risks, particularly if the putative patient
describes an emergency situation.3"' Any kind of personalized response, let alone
any type of diagnosis or treatment advice, however, would likely create a jury
issue over the creation of a physician-patient relationship, even if disclaimers
accompanied the communication."' Rather, the only legally sound approach is
for the physician to respond to an electronic inquiry with a standard form
response, that in no way refers to the specific sender or the sender's disclosed
information, which (1) informs the questioner that the physician does not answer
such online questions, (2) supplies the questioner with the physician's offline
office information in case the questioner would like to make an appointment, and
(3) provides contact information for the emergency services and suggest the
questioner contacts same if he or she cannot wait for an appointment during
regular business hours.
2. Risk-Managing a Blurred Relationship.-The correlate of this scenario
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See generally Gunther Eysenbach & Thomas L. Diepgen, Responses to Unsolicited
Patient E-mail Requests for Medical Advice on the World Wide Web, 280 JAMA 1333, 1333
(1998).
381. Cf Patricia C. Kuszler, A Question of Duty: Common Law Legal Issues Resulting from
Physician Response to Unsolicited Patient Email Inquiries, J. MED. INTERNET RES. (2000),
available at http://www.jmir.org.2000/3/e17; Mary V. Seeman & Bob Seeman, E-psychiatry: The
Patient-Psychiatrist Relationship in the Electronic Age, 161 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1147 (1999),
available at 1999 WLNR 189189 ("Clearly, the most judicious course of action is not to respond
to email queries.").
382. Cf. Eric E. Shore, Giving Advice on Social Networking Sites, 85 MED. EcoN. 18 (2008),
available at 2008 WLNR 25457729.
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also requires attention. If one assumes an existing physician-patient relationship
and that the physician is utilizing social network tools to extend the treatment
space, what are the liability risks? Regarding the use of email communication
between patient and physician, the AMA stresses notification by the physician
to the patient of the risks and limitations of such communication. These include,
"potential breaches of privacy and confidentiality, difficulties in validating the
identity of the parties, and delays in responses. ' 383 Any such communication
should be preceded by informed consent regarding these risks a.3  Absent such
setting of professional and technological expectations (and boundaries) liability
risks may arise if a physician is not checking social network posts regularly (or
regularly as the patient posts) and fails to see, say, a time-sensitive diagnostic
signal.385
3. Appropriateness of "Friend" Relationships.-Suppose that there is an
extant physician-patient and, hence professional relationship, but that a social or
personal relationship subsequently develops through a social network
intermediary. This phenomenon has received the most commentary regarding
employment relationships in situations where employers seek to friend
employees and exploit access to posted data such as opinions or photographs.386
At the extreme, social relationships between physicians and patients can
involve sexual relationships. 387 The AMA characterizes "[s]exual contact that
occurs concurrent with the patient-physician relationship" as "sexual
misconduct.""3 Non-concurrent relationships may also be unethical "if the
physician uses or exploits trust, knowledge, emotions, or influence derived from
the previous professional relationship., 389 These concepts of trust, exploitation,
and the primacy of patient well-being help to tease out the application of ethical
principles to "friending" online.
Nadelson and Notman have helpfully explored these greyer areas of
physician-patient relationships. They differentiate between "minor boundary
crossings" that they do not regard as "exploitative" from those that they
383. AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 5.026(3)-The Use of Electronic Mail (2003),
http ://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion5026.shtml.
384. Id. § 5.026(4).
385. See generally Chen, supra note 264.
386. See, e.g., Michelle Wilding, Is Your Boss Your Friend or Foe?, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, May 19,2009, http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/biztech/is-your-boss-your-friend-
or-foe/2009/05/18/1242498695453.html?page--fullpage#contentSwapl.
387. See generally Paul S. Appelbaum et at., Sexual Relationships Between Physicians and
Patients, 154 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2561 (1994); Linda J. Demaine, 'Playing Doctor' with the
Patient's Spouse: Alternative Conceptions ofHealth Professional Liability, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y
& L. 308 (2007).
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categorize as "damaging boundary violations.,390  For the purposes of this
Article, the vocabulary Nadelson and Notman use to frame the issues is on point
here. In particular, they state:
An essential element of the physician's role is the idea that what is best
for the patient must be the physician's first priority. Physicians must set
aside their own needs in the service of addressing their patient's needs.
Relationships, such as business involvements, that coexist
simultaneously with the doctor-patient relationship have the potential to
undermine the physician's ability to focus primarily on the patients' well
being, and can affect the physician's judgment.39'
Some physicians argue that the use of social network tools to extend the
physician-patient relationship allows the patient to see the "human side" of the
physician. 92  However, as Nadelson and Notman observe, "at times self-
disclosure may be excessive and create difficulties. The patient may react
negatively and it may seem like a role reversal if the doctor begins to disclose
personal problems to the patient," and can create a "boundary problem because
it can use the patient to satisfy the doctor's own needs for comfort or
sympathy." '393 Specific ethical guidelines consistent with this approach caution
physicians regarding, for example, discussion of politics394 or "derogatory
language or actions." '395 In short, the physician must be protective of the patient's
needs, and not his own.
D. Physicians "Tweeting" or Posting About Their Work
The modem Hippocratic Oath will include language such as "I will respect
the hard-won scientific gains of those physicians in whose steps I walk, and
390. Carol Nadelson & Malkah T. Notman, Boundaries in the Doctor-Patient Relationship,
23 J. THEORETICAL MED. 191, 192 (2002).
391. Id. at 195; see also AM. PSYCH. ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHIcs WITH
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY 13 (2009), http://www.psych.org/
MainMenu/PsychiatricPractice/Ethics/ResourcesStandards.aspx (follow "The Principles ofMedical
Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry" hyperlink) ("A psychiatrist shall not
gratify his or her own needs by exploiting the patient.").
392. See Stacey Butterfield, Twitter: A Medical Help, Hindrance or Hype?, ACP INTERNIST,
Apr. 2009, http://www.acpinternist.org/archives/2009/04/ twitter.htm; Carleen Hawn, Take Two
Aspirin and Tweet Me in the Morning: How Twitter, Facebook, and Other Social Media Are
Reshaping Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 361 (2009). See generally Chen, supra note 264.
393. Nadelson & Notman, supra note 390, at 197.
394. AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.012-Physicians' Political Communications with
Patients and Their Families (1999), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion90l2.shtml.





gladly share such knowledge as is mine with those who are to follow." '39 6 The
AMA Code of Medical Ethics includes in its description of the physician's role,
"a teacher who imparts knowledge of skills and techniques to colleagues., 397 Not
surprisingly physicians embrace new technologies to fulfill their educational
responsibilities. However, posting or "tweeting" about their work is not without
its risks.
1. Blogging and Posting.-According to 2008 research, 12% of Internet
users (9% of all U.S. adults) "blog," while 33% of Internet users (24% of all
adults) read blogs.395 Kovic and colleagues estimated that there are over one
thousand active English-language medical blogs, and found that these medical
bloggers are highly educated and that many had previously published scientific
papers.399 Yet, only a relatively small number of participants in the medical
blogosphere identified themselves as healthcare professionals. 400  Seeman 40'
identified the six most highly used health-related blogs as BadScience.net
(written by a U.K. physician who critiques media coverage of science),40 2
Medgadget.com (written by MDs and biomedical engineers), 3 thejournalist-run
Wall Street Journal Health Blog,4 4 SharpBrains (concentrating on "brain fitness"
and "the cognitive health" market),0 5 KevinMD.com (written by a New
Hampshire-based primary care physician; its associated Twitter site, @kevinmd,
has more than 20,703 "followers"),4 6 and Diabetes Mine (a patient information
and support blog).4 °7
Lagu and colleagues examined 271 blogs written by healthcare providers and
396. The Hippocractic Oath: Modem Version, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath_
modem.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
397. AMA CODE OF MEDICAL En-HCS § 9.08-New Medical Procedures, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion908.shtml (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010).
398. Aaron Smith, New Numbers for Blogging and Blog Readership, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT, July 22, 2008, http://www.pewintemet.org/Commentary/2008/July/New-numbers-
for-blogging-and-blog-readership.aspx.
399. Id.
400. Ivor Kovic et al., Examining the Medical Blogosphere: An Online Survey of Medical
Bloggers, 10 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e28 (2008), http://www.jmir.org/2008/3/e28/; cf Deirdre
Kennedy, Doctor Blogs Raise Concerns About Patient Privacy (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast Mar.
13, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=88163567 (noting
120,000 medical blogs).
401. Neil Seeman, Inside the Health Blogosphere: Quality, Governance and the New
Innovation Leaders, 7 ELECTRONICHEALTHCARE 101 (2008).
402. Bad Science, http://badscience.net/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
403. Medgadget, http://medgadget.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
404. Health Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
405. SharpBrains, http://www.sharpbrains.com/blog/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
406. Kevin MD.com Medical Weblog, http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2010).
407. Diabetes Mine, http://www.diabetesmine.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
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found that 42.1% described interactions with individual patients and 16.6%
included information detailed enough that patients could identify the provider or
themselves.4 8 Eight blogs included imaging related to patients and three blogs
even showed identifiable photographs." 9 Patients were portrayed negatively in
17.7% of blogs; negative comments about the healthcare system appeared in
31.7% of blogs.41°
Certain types of blog posts, each with different levels of attendant risk, can
be identified.4 ' The first, which will pose few legal risks, may be thought of as
"peer blogging," where healthcare providers seek to reach out to their colleagues
much as they do in offline channels such as medicalj ournals or even professional
conferences, discussing new treatments, drugs, or technologies.
The second is the "ranting" blog post, where physicians might vent about
salaries, low health care reimbursement rates, long working hours, and other
issues that frustrate them.412 Such posts could generate unwelcome attention
from peers, institutional providers, or medical boards. Suppose, for example, that
a physician posted, "I had a case today dealing with a patient previously seen by
Dr. Smith; I spent the best part of the day putting right what he did wrong! " Such
a communication is likely to get the attention of the peer who could sue for
defamation.4 3 It might also attract scrutiny from professional organizations or




411. See generally Julia M. Johnson, Web Risk Blogging Can Be a Medically Useful Tool
for Doctors; but Details CouldDoom Your Career, MO. MED. L. REP., June 2008 (interview with
Nicolas Terry); Kennedy, supra note 400.
412. See Scott R. Grubman, Note, Think Twice Before You Type: Blogging Your Way To
Unemployment, 42 GA. L. REV. 615 (2008); see also David Kravets,APReporterReprimandedFor
Facebook Post; Union Protests, WIRED, June 9, 2009, available at http://wired.com/
threatlevel/2009/06/facebooksword (discussing various adverse employment disciplinary actions
brought by employers against Facebook-posting employees).
413.
In a suit for defamation, a private plaintiff must allege (1) publication of false statements
about the plaintiffthat "expose [] [him] to distrust, hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy
or which cause [him] to be avoided, or which [have] a tendency to injure [him] in his
office, occupation, business or employment."
Saadi v. Maroun, No. 8:07-cv-1976-T-24-MAP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42574, *10 (M.D. Fla.
May 20, 2009) (quoting Cooper v. Miami Herald, 31 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla. 1947)). The plaintiff
must also allege that the publication was "(2) done without reasonable care as to the truth or falsity
of those statements; and (3) that result in damage to that person." Id. (citing Hay v. Indep.
Newspapers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 293, 294-95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)). In Saadi, the court found
that the defendant's allegations, published on a blog that the plaintiff was an unemployed lawyer
and that his car was purchased with stolen money, to be triable whether they satisfy elements these
three of a defamation suit. Id. at *11-12. The court further found that even though the blog was
political in tone, there was a sufficient mix of fact and opinion as to be reasonably construed as
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medical boards for unethical conduct,4 4 and could violate the terms of a contract
with an employing or credentialing healthcare institution.
The highest level of risk is associated with a blog posting that involves the
risk of a patient being identified. Here, both the breach of confidence tort and
HIPAA may be implicated. Physicians may use pseudo anonymous terms to
describe the cases they reference in an attempt to reduce the possibility of
positively identifying any patient in a blog discussion. Notwithstanding such
efforts, re-identification may be possible from detailed demographics, location,
as well as symptoms. Discussing general breaches of confidentiality, Brann and
Mattson note, "[ulnintentional confidentiality breaches have been overheard in
elevators, cafeterias, hallways, doctors' offices, and hospital rooms and at
cocktail parties."415 The authors' typology of breaches included disclosures by
healthcare providers to their own family members 4 6 and to their friends.417 As
they describe in the latter context (which is analogous to social network posts),
[i]n providing confidential information to friends, health care providers
run an even greater risk of harming patients. This is because they may
not be as aware of their friends' extended network of relationships as
they are of their family's. Consequently, they may have even less
control over who else might become privy to the confidential
information. Is
2. Twitter Feeds andStatus Updates.-In February 2009, a surgeon at Henry
Ford Hospital in Detroit provided a real-time Twitter feed during his
performance of a robotic partial nephrectomy on a patient." 9 This was not a
rogue surgeon indulging a personal interest. Dr. Craig Rogers is a well-known
urologist and the feed, written by his chief resident, was publicized in advance
defamation. Id. at * 14. In the example cited, the fact that the discussion would likely be predicated
on an actual patient or health problem would make it easier for courts to find defamatory statements
when mixed with opinion. Note also that First Amendment protection for derogatory blog posts
is limited. See, e.g., Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App'x 637 (9th Cir. 2009) (defense summary
judgment upheld in § 1983 action by teacher against supervisor who was transferred after making
comments on her personal blog), amended by 08-35310, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19327 (Aug. 27,
2009).
414. See, e.g., AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.03 1-Reporting Impaired, Incompetent,
or Unethical Colleagues, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/
code-medical-ethics/opinion9031.shtml (specifying how such issues should be dealt with).
415. Maria Brann & Marifran Mattson, Toward a Typology of Confidentiality Breaches in
Health Care Communication: An Ethic of Care Analysis of Provider Practices and Patient
Perceptions, 16 HEALTH COMM. 231, 233 (2004) (citations omitted).
416. Id. at 244-45.
417. Id. at245.
418. Id.
419. Elizabeth Cohen, Surgeons send 'Tweets'from Operating Room, CNN.COM, Feb. 17,
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/02/17/twitter.surgery/index.html.
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by his hospital system.4 2° The avowed purpose of the feed was "to get the word
out" about less invasive surgical techniques.421
As previously noted, the AMA Code of Ethics mandates that either
contemporaneous or recorded observations of physician-patient interactions must
be preceded by explicit agreement and comprehensive informed consent.
Separate consents are required both for the original recording and any subsequent
broadcast. The consent must state that patient's decision will not affect the
medical care he or she receives.422
These general rules are reinforced by various ethics opinions from specialty
organizations. 423 For example, in answer to the question, "May I use a videotape
segment of a therapy session at a work-shop for professionals?" the American
Psychiatric Association listed the following preconditions:
1. The patient gives fully informed, uncoerced consent that is not
obtained by an exploitation related to the treatment.
2. The proposed uses and potential audience are known to the patient.
3. No identifying information about the patient or others mentioned
will be included.
4. The audience is advised of the editing that makes this less than a
complete portrayal of the therapeutic encounter.424
The common law privacy rules are consistent. Recall Vassiliades v.
Garfinckel's, Brooks Brothers, where a physician published before and after
photographs of his patient via a television commercial.425 The court found "[t]he
nature of the publicity ensured that it would reach the public."426 It seems
reasonably clear that public Twitter feeds or unsecured Facebook pages will
satisfy the courts' emerging approach to "public" disclosure as discussed in
Yath.427 As evidenced by the increased use of such feeds by public entities (such
as police departments), this is a broadcast medium designed to reach the
public.
428
The specific difficulty faced by physicians using social network real-time
broadcast technologies such as Twitter feeds or Facebook status updates is how
420. Live Surgery on Twitter, Please Join Physicians from Henry Ford for Our Next Live
TwitterSurgeryEvent on February 9th, http://www.henryford.com/body.cfin?id=51168 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010).
421. Cohen, supra note 419.
422. See supra text accompanying note 230.
423. See, e.g., AM. PSYCH. ASS'N, supra note 391, at 24.
424. Id.
425. See supra text accompanying note 179.
426. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 588 (D.C. 1985).
427. See supra text accompanying note 325.
428. See, e.g., Lisa Respers France, Police Departments Keeping Public Informed on Twitter,
CNN.coM, Mar. 13, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/03/13/police.social.




to satisfy the ethical and legal requirements of consent. Informed consent does
not scale well and application of consent requirements analogous to filming or
broadcasting patient treatments include quite specific (and close to impossible)
requirements of the disclosure of the audience that will see the broadcast.
Arguments that the patient was anonymous (or, in HIPAA terms, that the patient
information was de-identified) may not be sustainable given the likelihood that
some in a public audience would be able to deduce the identity of the patient.
One blogger has published "140 Health Care Uses for Twitter"429 and,
perhaps, physicians pushing status updates from an emergency room honestly
believe that they are educating others about the practice of medicine. However,
if either the tweeting or the blogging is about patients, the admonition from
Nadelson and Notman requires reiteration; "what is best for the patient must be
the physician's first priority. '430
CONCLUSION
The issues examined in this article are about context. For many readers there
may be no issue deserving of legal resolution-merely bemusement that anyone
would act online in a manner analogous to wearing a t-shirt proclaiming "I Like
Weed" or "If You Can Read This, I've Been Paroled" to a job interview.
Similarly, it may be argued that the legal system should not rescue those with bad
judgment or concern itself with risky behavior that is exposed to all by users who
fail to make appropriate use of available privacy or security settings. As more
people lose their jobs or their health insurance because of what they post online
perhaps more users will employ these settings to disaggregate their "friends" or
otherwise modulate their online behavior. Equally, healthcare institutions,
teaching hospitals, and physician organizations are likely to make their views
about the online behavior of their physicians far more pointed and embed them
in normative form. From there such norms are likely to migrate to our legal and
regulatory systems.
The soft (even soft law) answers to many of the issues discussed in this
article are, first, to increasingly incorporate the issues raised into professional
training and institutional risk management strategies. Second, observe as press
and public opinion (combined with nudges from regulatory agencies such as the
FTC) force social network sites to increase the number and transparency of
protective online tools they make available to users. However, changes to their
architectures, such that robust privacy and security settings become the default,
challenge aspects of the services' business models and likely will not occur soon,
or willingly. Third, whatever the EEOC ends up proposing with regard to social
network data and GINA, we are likely to see legislatures or regulatory agencies
fashion some bright lines as to when posted data can or cannot be used in some
contexts or by some persons.
429. Phil Baumann, http://philbaumann.com/2OO9/O1/16/140-health-care-uses-for-twitter/
(Jan. 16, 2009, 14:2 1).
430. See supra text accompanying note 391.
[Vol. 43:285
2010] LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL NETWORKING 341
Beyond and, perhaps, before such amelioratory strategies, the common law
of boundaries must step up and protect responsible users online. True to its
context-based framework the law of boundaries should recognize private or
secluded areas that have been established by users of social network sites.

